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Abstract. We develop a new understanding of the historical horizon of event
ontology. Within the general area of the philosophy of nature, event ontology
is a still emerging field of investigation in search for the ultimate materialist
ontology of the world. While event ontology itself will not be explicated in full
mathematical details here, our focus is on its conceptual interrelation with the
dominant current of Idealism in Western thought approached by us as a problem
in the history of ideas. Our presentation is designed to be accessible to a wider
audience. We especially highlight the deep connection between event ontology
and postmodernism in general, and the post-war French philosophers Althusser,
Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari in particular, who are viewed as main sources
for current and future programs of abstract materialism.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivations, Problem Formulation, and Objectives
The philosophy of nature is usually treated as a distinct topic in general philosophy, separate
from existing conventional areas such as metaphysics and epistemology. However, there exists
a venerable tradition that goes back to ancient Greece, China, and India, in which Nature was
seen as the totality of everything that can be, including ethics, social being, and even religion.
In relatively recent times, this approach was revived and taken up by several thinkers,
chief among them are Bergson [1], Jakob von Uexküll [2], Russell [3, 4], Whitehead [5],
Simondon [6,7], Deleuze and Guattari [8]. In particular, we would like to concentrate here on
a particular approach to the philosophy of nature known as event philosophy. Furthermore,
a specific additional narrowing of the scope will be equating event philosophy with event
ontology. Events are not to be confused with the Epicurean atoms [9]. In fact, the idea of
the event as an “ontological atom” appeared several times throughout history, often under
very different names, e.g., “monads,” “aktions,” “actants,” “Machian sensations,” and so on.
Within its most ambitious formulation (Leibniz’s monads [10], Schelling’s Aktion [11]), event
philosophy aspires to show that events are the ultimate (nonperceptual) basic building blocks
of the Real, underlying even atoms and molecules [12, 13].
The goal of this article is to introduce a relatively comprehensive and original view on
the historical background to event ontology within Western philosophy.1 Our methodological
approach is influenced by the concept of lifeworld (Dilthey [14], Husserl [15], Habermas [16].),
1In this paper, we crudely define Western philosophy as the philosophical output produced in
Greek, Latin, Arabic, and the modern European languages. The most important trait unifying all
of this quite large and essentially heterogeneous literature is that it is ultimately founded on Greek
philosophy in particular, and Hellenistic canonical texts in general. The non-Western philosophical















Figure 1: Event ontology in its full cross-disciplinary reach to other knowledge fields.
but particularly in its hermeneutical and ontological dimensions due to Heidegger [17, 18]
and Gadamer [19,20]. Even though Althusser does not use the term, the idea of a historical
lifeworld, serving as the ontological horizon or universe of intercommunications, exchange,
and mutual inspiration shared by either a group of people, cultures, or minds, finds its
most striking application in the world of ideas and thought systems. Indeed, Althusser
work [21–24] is unique in the unified manner by which both the history of ideas and the history
of civilizations are treated within the same theoretical framework. We have sought to use
this Althusserian approach in our research into the historical background to event ontology
by focusing on the effective lifeworld of ideas, rather than presenting a historiography of
previous texts and writers.
Furthermore, the inherently multidisciplinary nature of event ontology (see Figure 1)
has forced us to adopt an approach in which no distinction between continental and analytical
philosophies is made. We cut through all traditions and treat them equally since some of
the most important contributions to event ontology had come from both camps. While
historically speaking the earliest sufficiently sophisticated system of events, or fragments of
such systems, are due to Leibniz and Schelling, our understanding of the lifeworld of ideas
pertaining to event ontology is heavily indebted to Russell, Heidegger, Deleuze, and Guattari,
whose views loom large in what follows. However, no complete and comprehensive technical
examination of their ideas is possible in a single article, but we try to provide extensive
remarks and references to the original literature. The main objective here remains to sketch
the overall distinctive features of the historical horizon of event ontology.
What are some of these main features? Our principal theses can be summarized as
follows (more details and references are provided in the main text after the Introduction):
(i) Event ontology is a response to the failure of Idealism.
(ii) Event ontology must perform a (Heideggerian) “destructive construction” of Idealism in








Figure 2: The creation of social ontology within the program of the philosophy of
nature goes through event ontology as an intermediate step.
(iii) Even ontology expands into social ontology (Figure 2.) This is best seen in our work
below through the fundamental role played by subjectivity and the production of subjects
(subjectification process) in the historical lifeworld of event ontology.
In order to establish objective (i), the concept of the ideological apparatus of
perception/introspection is introduced and the focus is laid on Kantianism, especially the
latter’s incarnation in modern mathematics. For objective (ii), we try to introduce new ideas
on the philosophy of events while interrogating, critiquing, and interpreting previous concepts.
In other words, and inspired by Heidegger, we believe that the history of ideas itself must be
constructive, and, as Gadamer used to say, understanding is already an interpretation and
hence requires exerting new ideas [20]. Regarding objective (iii), this will be achieved by
directly integrating postmodernist theories of social ontology right at the beginning of our
investigation. As the reader will be quick to note, the names Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze,
Guattari will show up very early and remain relevant to the end.
Yet from the more technical side, objective (iii) requires a careful approach to the quite
complex and still open problem of the production of subjectivity in nature. We believe that
all the social sciences might receive their foundations eventually from within the philosophy
of nature. When that happens, a naturalistic understanding of subjectivity is essential to
combat Idealism. In our account we provide extensive comments and insights on this topic.
We openly admit that our approach to subjectivity has been heavily influenced by the ideas
of the French philosopher Felix Guattari (more so than Foucault and Russell), especially
through his collaboration with Deleuze to write Capitalism and Schizophrenia [8, 25]. We
try to show how postmodernism in general, and Guattarianism in particular, represents
some of the most fascinating avenues along which earlier formal constructions of events by
writers such as Russell and Whitehead (using mathematical philosophy) may be expanded
and strengthened.
1.2. Topics Omitted in this Investigation
To keep the present article at a manageable size, and due to the very cross-disciplinary and
wide scope of this work, we have been forced to make several painful omissions of topics
whose satisfactory treatment would otherwise make the text prohibitively large. The most
important are:
(i) Non-Western philosophical traditions (e.g., ancient Chinese and Indian philosophies of
nature) are note discussed.
(ii) We focus mostly on modern Western philosophy, especially the period started by
Descartes. Pre-modern Western philosophy (mostly written in Latin and Arabic) is
not treated here in depth. However, we believe such treatment is necessary in the
future in order to understand the historical roots of Leibniz and Schelling’s ontologies of
monads and aktions, respectively. For instance, more research is needed on the difference
between the modern definition of events and medieval corpuscles.
(iii) We use mostly primary literature. In general, the adopted methodology is to read
the original major texts, and then construct the relevant historical lifeworld based on
interpretation of this reading.2 The extremely large and excellent relevant secondary
2Schopenhauer and Heidegger, for example, strongly advocated such method. Wittgenstein is a
famous example of the extreme opposite.
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literature has been left out of the main narrative. Any attempt to deal even with a part
of the secondary literature would require a book-length treatment.
(iv) The works of the distinguished philosopher and historian Michel Serres have not been
extensively discussed in this paper even though, we believe, Serres represents one of the
most important major contemporary figures with respect to the philosophy of nature,
especially in his three books [26–28]. While some references to his work and concepts are
inserted into the main text below, we found that including a more extensive discussion
of Serres will require a considerably more space so we opted for the current omission.
(v) We don’t consider in this paper the detailed mathematical treatment of how events are
constructed and used to solve concrete problems in the philosophy of nature. However,
see [3–5,12,13,29] for some previous attempts.
The author hopes that future publications will address some or all of the above omissions.
For the present purpose, the complexity and the very multidisciplinary nature of the topic
requires avoiding to deal with the entire subject at one time in order to make the presentation
accessible to a wider audience in philosophy, history, science, and the humanities.
1.3. Outline of the Structure and Content of this Article
Due to the complexity of the argument developed below, we first sketch a quick outline of the
various sections and subsections included in the main text. The reader may benefit by first
going through the Conclusions Section 8 then using the following summaries as a guideline.
After the Introduction, Section 2 provides a quick overview (and interpretation) of three
key figures in the development of event ontology: Ernst Mach, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred
N. Whitehead. While not an event ontologist himself, the remarkable scholar and historian
of ideas Ernst Cassirer will be briefly discussed at the historical juncture of moving from the
late nineteenth-century Machian formulation to the twentieth-century theories of Russell and
Whitehead.
In Section 3, we look into the main historical current of Idealism and argue that, at least
relative to event ontology, it represents the most important intellectual direction of modern
Western thought. We formally capture the essence of Idealism through the concept of the
ideological apparatus of perception/introspection. This will be accomplished by a series of
carefully written subsections. First, a general view that goes back to Plato and Augustine is
given in Section 3.1, followed by a more specialized treatment of Descartes and the central
figure of Kant in Section 3.2. One of our contributions is integrating, at an early stage
of the presentation, the philosophical and historical evolution of modern mathematics with
the historico-philosophical critique of Idealism, a step initiated in Section 3.3. There, the
startlingly successful role played by Hermann Weyl in launching the program of geometrizing
nature – a key legacy of Idealism – is highlighted and interpreted in terms of the evolution
of event ontology.
Section 4 is the most technical in the paper. Its purpose is to provide a more detailed
substantiation of the arguments and proposals given in the previous Section 3. Here, we
examine the very concepts of mind, consciousness, language, and cognition as the key
structural components of Idealism and how event ontology attempts to reverse the traditional
narrative. This will be conducted in different stages, each consigned to a separate subsection
with distinct flavor. First, in Section 4.1 we examine the fundamental question of the relation
between language and the world. The inherently indecisive nature of this question and all
previous attempts at proposing final answers will lead us into the content of Section 4.2,
which openly deals with how Idealism ontologized human consciousness. (Event ontology
will then attempt to replace this ontologization by a new one based on events.) The genesis
of the object in Idealism is formally treated in Section 4.3, followed by our reinterpretation
of the essence of the Idealism of Kant and Weyl’s group-theoretic ontology in Section 4.4,
where some methods borrowed from Husserl and Heidegger are used. We then briefly address
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in Section 4.5 the issue of time in dynamics and becoming due to its fundamental connection
with event ontology when the latter is viewed as a theory of dynamic spaces. The highly
unusual role played by Fichte in our narrative is highlighted in Section 4.6. Schopenhauer’s
ontology of the cosmic Will in nature is addressed in Section 4.7 due to its relevance to the
inherent dynamism of events in event ontology.
In order to prepare for the transition to the modern, post-war period of event ontology,
Section 5 contains a brief sketch of what we conceive as the first signs of the emergence of
social ontology out of the sociology of Karl Marx and Richard Wagner’s art-based social
approach to reality and nature. We hope that the future development of a naturalistic social
ontology should complete the program of event ontology as a universal “theory of everything.”
This short section also presents an opportunity to prepare the reader for our next (and final)
section before the conclusion, which is about postmodernism.
The postmodern phase is briefly considered in Section 7. The aim here is to explore
the transition from event ontology proper, i.e., as a critique and alternative to Idealism, to
social ontology. The French postmodernists who have already figured up prominently in
the previous parts are quickly reexamined in Section 7.1. The key problem of subjectivity
is outlined in Section 7.2 from the ontological viewpoint, i.e., not merely the sociological
perspective. The production of subjectivity (ontogenesis, individuation, subjectivization) is
then treated in some details in Section 7.3 under the rubric of subjectification.
The main conclusion is finally given in Section 8. In our view, the problem of the
production of subjectivity in event ontology remains open and constitutes one of the most
interesting research subjects in the philosophy of nature to address in future works.
2. Some Background to Event Philosophy
The revered traditional program of perception-based philosophy (Idealism) has failed, and
event philosophy is a response to this failure. As a matter of fact, we quite often find the
two terms ‘events’ and ‘perception’ juxtaposed in many accounts of event-based philosophies.
This is particularly true with three main sources we will work with this here, the philosopher-
scientist-mathematicians:
(i) Ernst Mach.
(ii) Alfred North Whitehead.
(iii) Bertrand Russell.
The three figures above may be grouped together in what we propose to call the Mach-
Whitehead-Russell Event Philosophy Program. This approach will be discussed frequently
in the present work, but attention should be brought, as early as possible, to the fact that
the most fundamental contribution to event philosophy came from post-Mach-Whitehead-
Russell thinkers. We mention here Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy [30], written in
the late 1930s but first published posthumously in 1989; Simondon’s two-volume book on
Individuation, published (in partial form) in the late 1950s [6, 7]; Deleuze’s The Logic of
Sense [31], first published in 1969; and lastly the magisterial treatise on the philosophy of
nature, A Thousand Plateaus, published in 1980 by Deleuze and Guattari [8]. These works
will be repeatedly used at different locations throughout the remainder of this paper.
2.1. Ernst Mach
The overall corpus of Mach’s writings may be viewed as a highly original and deep
contribution to the philosophy of nature by one of the most distinguished thinkers of the 19th
century, where we find that history, physics, biology, and psychology are all treated on equal
basis and integrated within a coherent worldview. The exact scope of Mach’s contributions is
still debatable. Although his influence on the history of science, research on perception, and
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physics are now widely recognized in the secondary literature, the interpretation of Mach’s
real intentions and aims, especially the philosophical ones, remains a thorny problem.
Examples abounds. In classical physics, the famous Mach Principle [32] is a striking
case of a general philosophical insight that had motivated much of the Einstein’s program
of general relativity. Yet, as has been recently pointed out by Julian Barbour, it remains
controversial whether the celebrated 1916 Einstein’s theory of general relativity [33] did
actually achieve Mach’s aims [34,35]. On another hand, Mach seems to be one of the earliest
adherents to the philosophical view called neutral monism, which was latter advocated by
William James [36] and is very closely related to Russell’s [3, 4, 12] and Whitehead’s [5, 13]
event ontology. This metaphysical view came from a writer who is publicly held as a stubborn
opponent of all kinds of metaphysical thinking. Similarly, Mach is usually taken as an enemy
(one of the last) of the doctrine of atomism in nature. Such widely held images contribute to
the false picture of Mach as a positivist or empiricist who strongly believed in something like
Hume’s psychological impressions, the so-called “sensations” in his major work The Analysis
of Sensation [37]. However, reading this particular book by Mach gives a very different
perspective on Mach the philosopher than the above mentioned canonical Mach the positivist
still prevalent in much of the secondary literature. It appears that the man was more of an
ontologist than he himself was aware of; and in the main thrust of the early chapters one
finds a consistent, unequivocal endorsement of a metaphysical worldview that aspires to fully
engage the multifarious flux of natural phenomena by tracing them back into fundamental
“building blocks” he calls elements.
The Machian elements are neither material nor mental; in fact, they are not even
intellectual constructions. Instead, they serve as the direct substrate of the ultimate nature
of things both “out there” and “inside us.” In fact, Mach himself does not take for granted the
existence of an unequivocal dividing line separating a “self” from its “world,” but understands
nature as a unified, total organic whole emerging from the collective interactions of multitudes
of elements. There is no difference between the elements of biology and the elements
we encounter in physics, and they are both continuous with a third range of elements
encountered in perception and physiology (the science combining physics and biology.) The
scientist-ontologist is equally interested in the three elemental types, but for methodological
reasons it is often expedient to differentiate his fundamental inquiry into Nature into various
pseudo-distinct disciplines. It is unfortunate that Mach made a mistake by deciding to
label these fundamental elements by the highly misleading term ‘sensations.’ Although he
warned against taking them naively as “psychological impressions,” as in fact is implied by
a direct interpretation of the term, that is, physiological phenomena happening in living
organisms, this very misunderstanding was nevertheless attributed to him by a majority of
Mach’s readers and commentators, with the notable exceptions few like James and Russell.
Another fundamental contribution by the Analysis of Sensations [37] was the
recognition, though not in a very formal manner, of the ontological status of relations. This
relationalist line of thought can be considered an extension of earlier positions developed by
the same author in his great and influential book on classical mechanics [38], where he severely
criticised the Newtonian conception of absolute space and advocated a more complex picture
of reality in which the latter is viewed as a totality of relations (Machian relationalism) [34].
For Mach, the main generators of drama in nature are not the basic “elemental stuff” of being,
but relations between elements, what he called less colorfully functional interdependence
[37], while also noting that it is precisely this kind of interconnection that happens to be
representable by the language of mathematics.
A complete relational system of nature, however, was never developed by Mach neither
in physics nor in biology, and probably part of the legacy of the twenty-first century will be
in finding ways to carry out this Leibnizian program in a rigorous fashion. Russell’s papers
on the mathematics of relations [39] can be considered one of the earliest and most ambitious
attempts in this direction within mathematical philosophy. Heidegger [40,41], Deleuze [42,43],
and Gilbert Simondon [6,7] took a gigantic step forward in this direction, but much remains to
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be done in constructing a fully-fledged relationalist event ontology. The Einstein-Weyl style
of doing relativity theory cannot be considered fully relational, but rather, following remarks
by Einstein himself, a “theory of invariants,” which is quite correct [44]. The dynamics in
relativistic spacetime is essentially woven into the fabric of an invariant line element (the
generalized interval or proper time). In this way, what appears at first sight as a relational
component in the theory, the focus on measurement of one system with respect to another and
banishing absolute space and time, is really a refashioning of the old absolute in new form,
the invariant metric of the space. In the case of special relativity, we have the speed of light
as a universal invariant of spacetime. In general relativity, the situation is more complicated
(and less clear) where the line element is invariant for the entire spacetime manifold but the
metric depends on the distribution of matter/energy and the boundary conditions [45,46]. In
any case, it is not clear why or how implementing a fully-fledged relationalism in relativity
physics should proceed after the model of the Kantian theory of invariants that so much
dominated the mathematical scene in the nineteenth century. Russell, in The Analysis of
Matter [3], appears to be among the very few who voiced similar objections regarding the
ontological status of the line element in the Einstein’s theory endorsed by Weyl, but he did
so politely, quietly, without a real desire to go head on against the public.
2.2. A Digression on Ernst Cassirer
A metaphysical concept of relation was advocated by the distinguished historian of culture
and ideas Ernst Cassirer, principally in his early short masterpiece, the 1910 text Substance
and Function [47]. Throughout his life, Cassirer had been fully informed about much of
the scientific, philosophical, and mathematical background of the problem of the event,
though he is not directly associated with event ontology as such. Writing in his signature
fascinating prose (lucid, overflowing, and historically rich), the essence of relational dynamics
– whose roots were already implicit in Mach and Bergson – is unfolded by Cassirer through
a breathtaking narrative that remains unmatched to date. Cassirer was one of those rare
intellectuals perfectly at home with both the humanities and the hard sciences, not to mention
the arts and culture. In this sense, as a historian of ideas working in the first half of the
twentieth century, he is probably second to none
In a less powerful follow up, he directly dealt with Einstein’s theory3 though he was
not fully successful in disclosing the hidden problem of relativity from the metaphysical
viewpoint. In response to quantum mechanics, Cassirer wrote a classic account of the role
of determinism [48]. This is a very remarkable historico-philosophical work that deserves
more attention. It predates Karl Popper’s more famous investigations of the same subject,
again developed in Cassirer’s characteristic historical prose style, where some of the major
philosophical problems of quantum theory were settled in a way that can be considered by
some as satisfactory and somehow conclusive. The work of Cassirer does not seem to have
attracted the attention it deserves in the Anglo-American world, especially the philosophy of
science.4 It is probably worth mentioning that Heidegger was critical of Cassirer’s treatment
of the concept of relation in Substance and Function although, as far as I know, there was
no detailed engagement with the Cassirer’s work itself in Heidegger’s published works.5
When it comes to engagement with the natural sciences, Cassirer’s objectives had been
to integrate the recent development in classical and quantum physics with the German
movement of neo-Kantianism, which was at its peak in the early decades of the twentieth
century [59]. However, this relation between neo-Kantianism as a general movement on one
3This short text was published in one volume with Substance and Function, see [47].
4Cassirer remains relatively popular in both the Anglo-American and continental secondary
literature, e.g., see [49–51]. What I intended to say here is that compared with other philosophers
of science such as Poincare [52, 53], Pierre Duhem [54, 55], Popper [56, 57], and Kuhn [58], he is
underrated.
5On the relation between Heidegger and Cassirer, see [59].
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hand, and the shift toward dynamical relationalism, essential for our understanding of event
ontology, is not visible or even comprehensible without the unique vantage point of Cassirer.
For example, Cassirer’s intellectual biography of Kant [60] clearly lays down its emphasis
on the organic phase of Kant’s thought, best captured by the Second half of the Critique
of Judgment [61]. That signifies the importance of theme of the philosophy of nature in
Cassirer’s thought, something he may not share with all other figures of the neo-Kantian
movement, the latter being more concerned with the problem of knowledge. But even
Cassirer’s treatment of the canonical subjects of neo-Kantianism in specialized texts such
as [62] is more akin to an “epistemology of nature” than a conventional “theory of knowledge”
as practiced in the prevailing logical and deductive/inductive analytical traditions.
Yet, in the majority of Cassirer’s works, a real turn toward the ontology of nature started
very late, probably close to the end of his life in 1945. The most important text would be the
unpublished fourth volume of his historico-philosophical magnum opus, the three-volume
study The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms [63–65]. Indeed, this posthumously published
text [63] contains one of the earliest metaphysical engagements in the philosophical literature
with the works of the biologist and the philosopher of nature Jakob von Uexküll [2, 66], a
key figure in event philosophy.6 Cassirer’s prose seems here to be less sure about the final
formulation of the problem, vacillating instead between an undeveloped theory of “symbolic
organism” (semantic biology) and a fully fledged program of Uexküllian metaphysics of
nature. In our story, Cassirer importance is that he prepared thr ground for later generations
of philosophers of nature by supplying us with extensive historico-philosophical literature
tying up various trains of thoughts and synthesizing the rudiments of a relational framework
for doing ontology, in spite of the fact that he himself did not develop the formal aspects of
the event ontology program of nature philosophy.
2.3. Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead: A Nonstandard Story
The extraordinary career of the mathematician-philosopher Alfred North Whitehead is
unthinkable without the long relationship that connected him with Bertrand Russell since
the 1890s till the beginning of the coolness and breakdown of their collaboration around
the breaking out of the First World War [68, 69]. Although commentators appear to prefer
the standard version of the story, where the young Russell is often projected as the brilliant
student with remarkable formal skills while Whitehead is the mature mentor, the deeply
motivated thinker who installed metaphysical substance into the mathematical philosophy
of the young Russell [68], careful reading of what Russel had actually thought and written
reveals a quite different view on the subject. Not only that, in retrospect, Russell appears
to have excelled his teacher Whitehead in mathematics itself, but, even more surprisingly,
the Russellian intuitive grasp and formulation of the fundamental problems of perception,
cognition, nature, and their complex interrelations in epistemology, is superior to Whitehead’s
at several levels.
Nevertheless, that does not suggest that Russell went as far as Process and Reality [5],
a book whose enormous cosmological scope is certainly beyond the manageable range of
Russell’s professed research interests.7 The truth is that the psychological makeups of the
two thinkers are quite different: One (Russell) is skeptical about speculative systems and
“Bergsonian mysticism,” while the other is impatient, at unrest when it comes purely formal
considerations, and not histant at committing himself to giant leaps of thought that may
transcend what is currently conceivable within the strictly mathematical framework. The
former had probably inherited his dislike of “speculation” from the painful experience of
6An earlier, more fundamental treatment of Uexküll’s thought within philosophy can be found in
Heidegger’s lecture courses of the late 1920s, most importantly [67].
7In any case, Russell does not seem to have spent much time working on the problems of dynamics,
evolution, and development, especially from the biological viewpoint, in spite of the strong influence
of Leibniz and his respect of Bergson.
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becoming Hegelian and then anti-Hegelian [70]. Distrust of German idealist metaphysical
speculation may have left a permanent mark on Russell, who throughout his long career
had expressed little enthusiasm for philosophers like Nietzsche or even a mathematically-
inclined philosopher like Husserl [69, 71]. On the other hand, Whitehead’s forays into
speculative thinking and his rapid self-imposed distancing from the formal mathematical
research that characterized his earlier works (before 1920) can be understood in light of his
very complex relation with Russell. Very briefly, to a certain extent the magisterial work
Principia Mathematica [72–74]8 convinced Whitehead, the older coauthor, that the long-
held faith in the limitless potential of mathematics as the most powerful formal device in our
possession that is capable of expressing the deep structure of reality is nearing its saturation
point. This conclusion, which was not shared by all other mathematicians, need not be
exactly Russell’s interpretation of his own work, although he also changed directions after
the war experience [68, 69]. In any case, it is conceivable that Whitehead not only did wish
to distance himself from Russell’s growing fame in order to reestablish a new direction of his
own, but, even more, it is imaginable that the Whiteheadian texts of the 1920s may – at
least partially – be understood as a reaction against Russell’s groundbreaking mathematical
and linguistic philosophy as it developed in the period 1900-1914.9
We are currently interested in the intellectual historical background to event ontology,
especially as manifested by the work developed after Mach through the writings of Whitehead
and Russell.10 In a very rough sketch, it is possible to refer to Russell’s well-known 1914 book
Our Knowledge of the External World [12] as one of the earliest accounts of the ontology
of events implicit in Mach and James but this time presented in a rigorous fashion. As
indicated in the Introduction to the work, Russell appears to have an access to a manuscript
by Whitehead which he used as a background for writing the chapter on causality and the
event structure of the world. From the autobiographical writings of Russell, we know that
such reference was the beginning of the breakdown of the relation between the two, especially
if we remember the political context of their essential differences regarding the First World
War. It is not important to “prove” the historical correctness of the incident or support the
story from multiple sources. This is not the strategy of the present work which aims at
providing a positive, constructive contribution to the problem.
Our approach is based on actually reading Russell’s 1914 text and then comparing it
to the first book-length account of event ontology published by Whitehead in 1919 [29].
The latter work is not as well written as the other Whitehead books published afterwards
throughout the 1920s and beyond. In fact, while An Enquiry Concerning the Principles
of Natural Knowledge [29] contains some of the fundamental technical ideas pertinent to
event ontology, the formulation itself is not as explicit and detailed as it should be. While
reading it, one gets the impression that Whitehead had not yet cracked the essence of his
technical investigation of the possibility of constructing a comprehensive ontology of the
world. This shortcoming would be partially alleviated by the publications of the next few
years. Meanwhile, I cannot resist drawing certain quick conclusions as follows.
First of all, not only Russell’s treatment of the problem – either in 1914 or in his later
major work – was technically superior to Whitehead’s, but it also appears as if the younger
philosopher had knowingly avoided aspects of weakness in the unpublished earlier formulation
by his teacher. To be more specific, Russell had carefully created a deeper metaphysical
appreciation of the problem surpassing that of Whitehead. The full technical details of
8These three massive books, published in 1910, 1912, and 1913, were completely written by
Russell who often conversed with Whitehead on topics related to the foundations of mathematics.
The order of the names (the older mentor Whitehead as first author) is largely symbolic.
9This view is not common or even seriously discussed in the secondary literature on Russell
and Whitehead. However, it will be entertained in our work and supported by multiple reflections,
although no extensive textual commentaries will be given.
10The full explication of how we understand the impact of Russell on modern philosophy is not
discussed in details below but pointers and indicators are given throughout.
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what events are and how they construct a world will be given in a different paper. For our
purposes here, it is enough to mention that there is a high probability that Whitehead’s
quick publication of the rather hastily assembled book [29] might have been a reaction to
Russell’s new formulation of event ontology. As the story goes by, Whitehead published a
second, much more organized and polished text, the great Concept of Nature [13], arguably his
true masterpiece, in 1920. Furthermore, in light of Whitehead’s growing public engagement
with the meteoric rise of Einstein’s fame in the early 1920s, he published a third book,
this time on relativity [75], in the year 1922. The three books collectively may be taken to
constitute some sort of a “trilogy on event ontology.” In a hindsight, they represent some
of the most remarkable contributions to the philosophy of nature in all time. Under the
shadow of these three books, Russell went ahead and developed his own peculiar grand
synthesis of mathematical philosophy and the philosophy of nature in the major book The
Analysis of Matter [3], written in the period 1925-1926 but published in 1927. But by
that time Whitehead had already moved away from strict event ontology and adopted a
more Bergsonian approach in his other books [5, 76, 77]. Here we discover that Russellian
mathematical philosophy is no longer the main object and apparatus of investigation; instead,
biology, life, development – and some few Aristotelian themes – take center stage, becoming
the main players in the Whitehead Universe.
It is not an easy matter to find in either Russell or Whitehead (or even Mach and
James) a very convincing concise statement to the effect of why there should be anything
like an event structure of the world. There seems to be no reason to assume the necessity of
giving such statement in an account that aspires to present a fundamental ontological view
of the world. Metaphysics is a movement of thought that emerges from the inner depths of
the thinker’s soul, only to freely wander around regardless to the pressures and demands of
the intellectual sphere inside which the philosopher happens to find himself living at that
juncture of time. As such, starting from Leibniz and going through Mach, James, Russell,
Whitehead, Deleuze, there has always been an acute dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of
the formal language adopted in the wake of Descartes’s and Galileo’s inception of modern
science and mathematical physics. Since the early days of the Cartesian Cogito [78–80],
conventional academic philosophy went ahead to build an increasingly idealistic account
of reality. Although Spinoza and Leibniz both represent a refreshingly early anti-Cartesian
reaction in mainland Europe, the truth is that everywhere in the Western world the unfolding
of intellectual history disclosed a strong inclination toward the common sense philosophy of
perception and introspection that can be found in Descartes’s Meditations [79]. Indeed,
John Locke’s Essay [81], Berkeley’s Dialogues [82], and Hume’s Treatise [83] are all different
ways of responding to Descartes’s formulation of the problem. In the particular form we
find in Hume, there is an unmistakable focus on psychology and knowledge, the problems
of cognition and experience, and a shift away from the study of nature as such. The most
complete and influential solution of the problem of perception and introspection was given
by Kant in his monumental book Critique of Pure Reason [84]. Since then, it is safe to say
that traditional and academic philosophy in the West has been circling around in a Kantian
playground. The last great Kantian was Husserl, who worked laboriously for over 40 years
to rebuild Western philosophy on rigorous basis [85–89] and unify it with nature [15] through
the straitjacket of transcendental phenomenology [90–92]. His attempt was a philosophical
failure, as Heidegger was the first to realize [93,94], but the conventional community remains
more or less Kantian par excellence.
3. Idealism: The Ideological Apparatus of Perception and Introspection
3.1. The (Dark) Legacy of Idealism in Western Philosophy
Idealism is inextricably linked to the decisive effect of the ideology of perception and
introspection, that is, the unique manner in which Western thinking – since Augustine [95]
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– has been viewing the cosmos and reflecting on the nature of the world. The invention
of the Cartesian subject finds its roots not merely in Descartes’s Meditations [79], the
official founding text of modern Western philosophy, but goes back to the way in which a
Hellenic elite, living in the western edge of the Near East, decided to reinvent the enigmatic
teachings of Jesus but this time in the form of a highly-institutionalized Church dogma
now called Western Christianity, and serviced by a systematic philosophical apparatus called
theology [96–98]. The quite idiosyncratic manner effectuating this transformation reflects in
turn the slow dissolution of the original impulse of Greek philosophy after Aristotle and
Epicures and the remarkable philosophical experimentation of the Stoics, Neoplatonism,
Skeptics, and early saints and martyrs operating within the new rising Christian creeds.
The problem of morality – how to live and die – was very acute in the first few centuries of
the Roman Empire [99–103] and had left its overcasting shadow on the entire cultural and
spiritual landscape in existence at that time and beyond. The general tendency was then
to turn away from the “outside” world and withdraw into the hidden strata of the “soul,”
the “deeper self” just discovered and elaborated by Augustine [95] in his own reworking of
Plotinus [104].
The irony is that the Cartesian subject had been lying dormant within Christianity
for well over a thousand years till the rise of capitalism and the bourgeois class which
found its philosophical culmination in the person of Descartes [105, 106]. The latter,
however, was never in deep opposition to the fundamentals of Western Christianity as is
now incorrectly portrayed by some currents in mainstream academic philosophy. Most of
Descartes’ ontological concepts, and even some of his important scientific apparatuses, were
taken over directly from the Schools [41, 107] but refashioned and refurbished in a unique
manner faithful to the novelises of the rising new social groups conducting philosophy: the
bourgeoisie or the middle classes [108–110]. In reality, Descartes replaced the Christian
God (personal deity) by the Cartesian Subject (personal ego), in line with the political
and economic changes that stormed Europe since the Renaissance and the beginning of the
collapse of the Medieval Universe [111–115]. The ideology of perception and introspection
initiated by the Cartesian Meditations has been humming in full – though latent – power for
thousands of years.
The very important question on whether the Greeks themselves had entertained a
conception of the Cartesian Ego is a complex one that has never been settled. It is well
known that in almost all of his writings published so far dealing with the subject, Heidegger
had consistently dismissed the orthodox idealistic Hegelian interpretation of history that
posits a Subject or metaphysical ego-consciousness in operation everywhere in philosophy
and nature, even in the pre-Socratic era (although some influential writers such as Adorno
doubt that the “authentic” Hegelian Subject is actually a Cartesian Subject [116–118].)
Accordingly, Heidegger believes that the concept of Ego Subject was completely alien to the
Greek way of thinking [41,119–128]. This interpretation is based on the peculiar Heideggerian
understanding of the ancient language and the Greek lifeworld, which is, in the main, very
unorthodox and quite original [19,129]. In most of his presentations of passages from Greek
philosophers, Heidegger had the habit of changing the translation of the original text in a
way that not infrequently would clash directly with the accepted academic standards, which
Heidegger did not bother about anyway. In spite of Heidegger’s sweeping interpretations
of ancient philosophy, if one forgets – just for the moment – about both the pre-Socratics
and Aristotle in order to focus instead on Plato’s texts, it is not difficult to find numerous
passages, remarks, expressions scattered throughout the dialogues, all strongly supporting the
possibility of an embryonic conception of human ego and consciousness. Even the modern
techniques of introspection (Fichte [130], Kierkegaard [131–133]) and dream analysis [134]
may find some uncanny resemblances with the innovative Platonic dialectic method of dealing
with mythological and poetic material and reconstructing reality based on remembrance of
things past, something akin to a hermeneutical reconstruction of “history” [20,135,136]. In any
case, the view that Idealism and Platonism are closely related is of course a signature of the
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Nietzsche’s position that directly influenced postmodernism as we will see later. For example,
Deleuze, in his first major work, openly stated that his project is to “invert Platonism” [43].
Heidegger’s position, of course, was considerably more complex and sophisticated, but also
ambiguous by not openly committing Plato to the Idealist “enemy camp” though for all
practical purposes Heidegger had never been as close to Plato as he had been to Aristotle
[93, 94].
3.2. The Destructive Cartesian Revolution of Kant
The overarching structure of the Cartesian subject reformulated “critically” as Kantianism
was very much the standard philosophical dogma in the last phase of modernism that ended
with the National Socialist Revolution that brought Hitler to power in 1933. As the well-
known story goes, following the nineteenth-century dissolution of German Idealism in its
Hegelian form, there had been a shift in Europe toward science and technology, mass culture
and open market societies [105]. The new rising industrial class founded a rehabilitated,
streamlined version of “materialism” whose intellectual background was most convenient and
appropriate to the new mutations of mercantilism, capitalism, and industrialization.
In such “positivistic” atmosphere, it was old Kant who came back to life in the gown
of neo-Kantianism. Philosophy became epistemology, and the foundational undertakings by
Kant in the field of metaphysics were quietly ignored. The main problem that faced the
philosophical community at the time was how to ground thinking in scientific principles, to
move scholastic and idealistic writings from the circle of speculations to the light of empirical
certainty as revealed in the axiomatic deductive methodologies of modern science. Note
that although the scientific method is usually dated to the works of Renaissance, Descartes,
and Galileo, the truth is that science as a social activity accepted by the prevailing order
independently of philosophy is really a very recent event, dating no earlier than to the 1830s.
This coincides with the decline of the philosophy of nature, not its rise, a paradoxical result.
Indeed, the main representative of the philosophy of nature in the period 1800-1830, most
importantly Schelling [11,137] and Alexander von Humboldt [138,139], where followed by the
first “modern scientists,” intellectual and multidisciplinary figures such as Helmholtz [140,141]
and William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) [142]. It is debatable whether polymaths like Helmholtz
and Thomson should be considered philosophers of nature. Also, Humboldt and Schelling
were as good scientist as they could be. The transition from the cross-disciplinary approach
to nature known as the philosophy of nature to the specialist fields of modern science is,
therefore, very odd.
Nevertheless, with such a chronological peculiarity, the emergence of modern science not
as philosophy of nature, but as a methodologically independent field of “disciplinary objective
research,” we may find some explanation of why Kant was taken back into the scene. The
idea is that the entire First Critique [84] may be evaluated as a vindication of Newtonian
mathematical physics but within the particular perspective of the theory of knowledge.11
The starting point of Kant is perception (he uses the technical term ‘intuition’), exactly as
in the tradition of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume [78–80, 83]. Spinoza and Leibniz,
the two major figures of the seventeenth-century counter-Cartesian movement, do not figure
up prominently in Kant’s thought; in fact, the two are, after all, marginal figures in both
Kantianism and German Idealism.12 This last observation is important since it indicates how
deep and long the entire Kantian project has been immersed into the ideology of perception
11Kant’s approach to the ontology of nature is less famous. The principal text is [143].
12This is still the case in spite of the positive position that Spinoza and Leibniz occupy in Schelling’s
and Hegel’s own reconstruction of the history of modern philosophy [144–146]. In such texts, they
generally claim to be followers of Spinoza (the philosophy of nature proper.) Schelling, of course, is
much closer to Leibniz (and Spinoza) than Hegel, just consider his main work on the philosophy of
nature [11], which is essentially a Leibnizian treatise in and through. Nevertheless, German idealism
in general is deeply entangled with Plato, Descartes, and most importantly Kant, whose writings
tend to overshadow others.
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and introspection, the latter effectively in dominant position since at least Augustine and the
Christian theological picture of a personal deity.
Now, one may ask why should the starting point in Kant’s analysis be sense perception,
a choice that reflects an implicit belief in the human mind as the most important source of
knowledge in existence.13. Although modern science as a professional social field was still
waiting for the next century to materialize, Kant clearly foresaw something fundamental
here: It is with nature that thinking should be paired, not spiritual transcendence or mystic
speculations. But the entire scope of this new grounding of thinking foundered from its
very beginning: perception itself is not a brute scientific fact as the seventeenth century
imagined itself discovering for the first time. Sensation is inseparable from a subject or
ego that performs the act of feeling and receiving sense data. The act itself is a manner
of interpretation, and hence couched in ideology from the very start. It took the combined
titanic efforts of Marx and Nietzsche to teach the Western world this simple but subtle truth,
and in recent time we find the best statement of the problem of ideology formulated – in a
way that goes much beyond what Marx himself anticipated – by Althusser [21, 149]. Later,
we will see how the Cartesian Subject itself is produced or constructed by the natural process
of ontogenesis (Simondon speaks of individuation [6]). In this case, the Subject is only
one of many individuals created in the ontological process and there is nothing particularly
important or terribly significant about human consciousness.14
We agree with Kant that philosophy should be allied with nature but disagree on
almost everything else: There is no Archimedean point centred at the human subject;
and metaphysics must be constructed on “objective” grounds that don’t leave any place
for “subjective valuations,” the latter are almost always entangled with ideology.15 The main
outline of the new ontology should not preserve a large space to perception and the problems
of cognition.16 Instead, we find the main task of philosophy, i.e., metaphysics, to be the
understanding of the entire structure of reality, where reality means nature in the large,
including both inanimate and animate matter, human and nonhuman societies [2, 5, 6].
The reaction to Kant in the nineteenth century was not as critical and destructive as
some classical accounts project the problem. For example, in his popular writings, Hans
Reichenbach triumphantly announces that general relativity had overcome the Kantian a
priori in space by demonstrating that non-Euclidean geometry is not only physically possible,
but even the only true actual real structure of our experience of space [150,151].17 Along the
same direction, similar conclusions were held by Weyl in various writings, most notably [157].
Although such interpretation of Kant – widely circulating after the discovery of non-Euclidean
geometry in the first half of the nineteenth century [158] – is not really tenable from the
philosophical viewpoint (it involves a distortion of the original impulses of Kantianism), this
point will not be pursued presently.
The other line of thought that will be picked up instead is the following: The crux of
modern mathematical physics, in both its pre-Kantian (Descartes, Galileo, Huygens, Newton)
and post-Kantian (Thompson, Maxwell, Einstein, Heisenberg) phases, remains essentially
centered around the predominance of the human subject as the main agent performing
the “duty” of what has become known as “scientific research” (a social field that already
comes equipped with a whole battery of power relations) by “interrogating nature” through
asking questions in the form of experiments and receiving answers by measurement. From
13Well, this is the age of Enlightenment, see Cassirer’s classic account of the period [147] Moreover,
Kant’s use of terms like ‘legalization’ and ‘grounding in law’ somehow betrays his hidden agenda,
which is essentially a bourgeoisie Enlightenment project [109] aiming at establishing new foundations
of philosophy closely allied to the natural science rather than religion [148].
14See also Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism [128].
15In the extended Althusserian sense especially developed in his unpublished manuscripts [149].
16These two in particular are best dealt with in the applied fields of psychology and physiology.
17Reichenbach’s mature views on spacetime are considerably more sophisticated, see [152, 153].
For a more recent careful investigation of the relation between Kant and the actual geometry of
spacetime and the laws of nature, see [154–156].
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the beginning, then, there has always been a mind to whom knowledge of nature must be
referred, an inquiring Gaze endeavouring to disclose the underlying order in reality “hidden”
(to whom?) beneath the thick surface of phenomena. The binary splitting of being in Kant
into intuition and concept18 is the new, innovative reformulation of the vexing Cartesian
duality of mind and body. The ultimate goal of the entire project of Kantian Critical
philosophy had been to push philosophy away from “objective metaphysics” by placing
the former at a relational critical altitude that rigorously views the task of thinking from
the vantagepoint of the knowing Cartesian subject. In this sense, after Kant, traditional
Metaphysics – the Schools and Wolff’s system – are deemed “dogmatic” precisely because the
metaphysical attitude, following Aristotle, had been trying to establish a supra-subjective
stand of which Nature is more fundamental than the Subject (Leibniz [10], Spinoza [159].)
The most successful implementation of Kant’s vision has been in modern mathematics and
theoretical physics, a topic we now turn to.
3.3. Modern Mathematics as the Highest Form of Idealism: Hermann Weyl and the
Geometrization of Nature
The rise of the commercial and bourgeoisie class, coupled with the impact of the Newtonian
revolution, both signaled the need to reestablish the intellectual framework of the Western
world on new grounds [160], which provided the background to the Enlightenment [147] and
the celebrated movement of the second Copernican revolution of Kant [60,161]. Within such
parameters, the exact details of the Kantian a priori itself are not significant for our purpose
here (the macrohistory of philosophy.) Whether space can be best modeled as Euclidean or
not is indeed irrelevant to the true content of the Kantian message. Actually, as developed
by Reichenbach himself in a way that remains unsurpassed up to date,19 all geometries
are essentially equivalent when it comes to the description of reality.20 This represents a
culmination of a train of thought, which started with Helmholtz [141,162,163], going through
Poincare [52, 164], and ending up with Einstein’s modern formulation of the problem in his
general relativity, later taken up again by Eddington [165–167] and Penrose [45,46,168–170].
But it is the other way around: Euclidean geometry itself is not an idealized system;
instead, it is the formalized outcome of the interaction between humans and nature. The
formalization of a vast body of geometric knowledge enacted by Euclid represents nothing but
a distilling of the very special historical manner in which our perception has been evolving
since the emergence of Homo sapiens as a distinct species [171], i.e., the evolution of our
geometric understanding of nature in and through our dealings with daily-life events and
surroundings [172], as reached by the present state of civilization through Nature’s historico-
political development [27]. In one way or another, all non-Euclidean geometries presuppose a
Euclidean core (the structure of perception) because the human mind, in its interaction with
nature, reaches an “equilibrium of knowledge” between abstract mental categories and actual
sense data precisely through the “optimim” model of Euclidean geometry [173]. Recognition
of the deep nature of the interrelation between cognition and mathematics was available
to Leibniz [10], who, paradoxically, appears to be still ahead of present-day thinking on
the subject. One might even conjecture that Leibniz avoided Kant’s mistake of positing
a transcendental intuition of space, time, and causality, precisely because of his better
understanding of the nature of cognition as a product of a strictly developmental process [174].
In this context, it is interesting to note that the biologist and philosopher of nature Konrad
Lorenz, who was somehow “embarrassed” by Idealism and Kant’s concept of the a priori in
geometry, had proposed in several of his writings that Kant’s philosophy of the transcendental
intuition [84] should be reinterpreted on phylogenetic bases [175,176], i.e., that epistemology
18Forget for now about reason, a very problematic ideological construction that has little to do
with formal ontology, at least for the time being
19The most important work is [152].
20See further analysis of Poincare’s geometric conventionalism [52] in [156].
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(Kant’s core) evolves in a Darwinian fashion as humankind itself changes while interacting
with nature. Karl Popper also proposed similar ideas [177].
After presenting various passages and analyses relevant to our topic, Lawrenz
summarizes the status of the problem in the following way:
We are limited, as has been said, by the fact that we are denizens of a a particular
dimension, and by the further fact that our senses evolved for the primary purpose
of detecting features in the environment that are important for us, but whose
detailed or fine structure composition is (on the whole) irrelevant to this context.
Precise shapes, straight lines and smooth curves are therefore the products of a
kind of transformation mechanism with which our mind is imbued and which it
performs virtually automatically. By the same token, we are endowed with cognitive
capability which provides us with the means of self-reflective analysis of those very
phenomena and thus, in imagination, to decompose (reduce) them in the effort
to reveal what is normally denied to us, i.e., the aforementioned fine structure.
As knowledge is apt to be ‘useful’ in the improvement of living condition. But
philosophically regarded, this same faculty enables us to represent corporeal reality
in a quasi-dimensionless setting, as aspects of reality which transcend those which
our immediate access denies us.21
The context of the above quote is Lawrenz’s penetrating analysis of Leibniz’s philosophy
of nature. Incidentally, Hermann Weyl, who generously quotes Leibniz in his major book
on the philosophy of nature [179], does not seem able to grasp the arbitrariness and lack
of ideality in geometry revealed by the above discussion. Like almost all other modern
mathematicians, Weyl follows Plato in elevating geometry into a transcendental realm of
fantastic idealistic perfection without paying the least attention to how frivolous the role
played by human consciousness in nature. Therefore, in place of attempting to build a non-
human mathematics, i.e., discovering mathematical structures that go beyond the Cartesian
knowing subject and its straitjacket of perception, Weyl went ahead and announced the
following major axiom guiding the student of nature: “The objective image of the world
may not admit of any diversities which cannot manifest themselves in some diversity of
perceptions; an existence which as a matter of principle is entirely inaccessible to perception
is not admitted.”22 In other terms, what cannot be distinguished in perception does not
exist: Being in mathematical physics is reduced to perceptual differentials.
Weyl, and together with him modern mathematical physics, is fanatically idealistic
in general, and devoutly Kantian in particular. This strange revelation may strike the
nonphilosophic reader as blatantly wrong since in popular accounts science is often presented
as a staunchly materialistic affair. There is actually no contradiction here. Idealism
and mainstream materialism are both expressions of the same concept, the Cartesian ego-
consciousness. In fact, they are both the product of the Cartesian project’s concomitant
power relation: the ideology of perception and introspection, which founds – and maintains
– the Cartesian Subject in both the individual’s psyche and the various social strata of the
public sphere. Idealism and the main currents of materialism are post-dualistic movements
responding in their own ways to the notorious dilemma of the mind/body problem bequeathed
on us by Plato’s, Augustine’s, and Descartes’ legacies, but while remaining completely within
the particular framework delimited by the epistemological parameters of the knowing subject.
Present day materialism should not be confused with the pre-Socratic naturalism of
the Ionian school [180], the former being essentially a modern invention, even if traces of
the concept of consciousness can be found in Neoplatonism and Augustine. The key aspect
of our problematic here is the strange coexistence of both a superficial materialist ideology
in science, most aggressively in biology, and a latent deeply idealistic foundational attitude
under the surface, more transparent in theoretical physics and pure mathematics than other
21Lawrenz [178], page 212.
22Weyl [179], page 117.
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disciplines. Examples abound. The measurement theory of orthodox quantum mechanics
(Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation [181] and its offspring [182]) is a very explicit Kantian
formulation of the laws of nature.23
In pure mathematics, the almost universally-accepted (or at least most popular)
“philosophical worldview” is naive Platonism, which, by the way, is – for all practical purposes
– the same as Platonism [186]. Working mathematicians simply believe in the factual
existence of mathematical objects in a third Platonic world (besides mind and nature) where
they enjoy a superior form of existence. To my best knowledge, the most powerful advocate of
Idealism in contemporary mathematics is Roger Penrose, see especially his vivid depiction of
Platonism in [46]. This concept of plain Platonism as a foundation for mathematics received
a devastating criticism in the masterful essays of Albert Lautman [187], who was also inspired
by Heidegger’s ontology.
Even though it is not an easy matter to accuse Plato of being a common-variety idealistic
philosopher (we agree with Heidegger that there is nothing further from truth than treating
Plato as a Cartesian Idealist [125, 127]), there is no doubt that his popular writings (the
dialogues) provided the foundational material in the West to nurture both Christianity and
idealism, with their common root to be located in the structure of ego-consciousness. In one
of his most direct passages, Weyl unconcealed the latent idealism lurking behind the bulk of
the mathematico-philosophical insights scattered throughout his vast writings:
Postulation of the external world does not guarantee that it will constitute itself
out of the phenomena through the cognitive work of reason as it attempts to create
the concordance. For this to take place it is necessary that the world be governed
throughout by simple elementary laws. Thus the mere positing of the external
world does not really explain what it was meant to explain, the question of the
reason of the world mingles inseparably with the question of the reason of its
lawful mathematical harmony. The latter clearly points toward another direction
of transcendency than that of transcendental world; towards the origin rather than
the product. Thus the ultimate answer lies beyond all knowledge, in God alone;
emanating from him, the light of consciousness, its own origin hidden from it,
grasps itself in self-penetration, divided and suspended between subject and object,
between meaning and being.24
It will be seen that the idea of God adopted by Weyl above is not the same as the more
sophisticated ontotheological concepts developed by Whitehead [5] or Zubiri [188]. Weyl’s is
the naive idealistic version (usually attributed to Hegel and the German Idealism of Schilling)
in which self-reflection and the “return to the self,” self-consciousness, present the essential
structure of the Absolute or Divine in nature. In the Western tradition, God is basically a
cosmic form of the human subject [189–191].
4. Nature, Language, and Consciousness
4.1. Is Language Isomorphic to the World?
How did consciousness, ego, and the subject emerge from under the long shadow of pre-
seventeenth-century era? While no fully satisfactory answer to such enormously complex
question can be given here, our narrative will deploy some aspects of human psychology
23We don’t have space to argue this in details given the enormous size of the literature on the
epistemological foundations of quantum physics. Note that the Kantian origin of the Copenhagen’s
interpretation is sometimes underplayed even in the technical expositions of the philosophy of science.
But modern quantum theory was developed in Göttingen [183], Hilbert’s playground and center
of global influence, which is very Kantian in spirit and orientation [184]. For example, John von
Neumann, the main architect of the measurement theory [185], is a student of Hilbert and shares
with him the common German tradition of Kantianism.
24Weyl [179], page 125.
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[192–194], in conjunction with basic elements of ideology [21, 149], in order to construct an
approximate philosophical sketch of the background to event ontology (the main subject of
this paper.)
We don’t know yet how the brain works in details, and no clear demarcation between
mind and its material biological substrate can be drawn as yet [195,196]. What has dominated
speculation and thinking about the subject is an extraordinary boldness of imagination on
the part of philosophers, backed by meticulous and shrewd direct observation of the Other
(perception) and the Self (introspection.) The masters of the latter method, Augustine [95],
Descartes [78–80], and Fichte [197, 198], knew very well that the structure of the outside
world does not seem to be isomorphic to the dizzying, infinitely multiplying constellations
of inner states we call feelings, affections, moods, ideas, images, etc. Nevertheless, they went
ahead and postulated that such isomorphism could be found in principle. In a nutshell, what
that amounts to is the quasi-religious belief that inner thinking is capable of disclosing the
deep structure of reality.
Such a powerful credo can be located in ancient philosophy, in fact as early as Plato’s
dialogues, where contemplating nature or discovering new findings about the external world
through purely logico-mathematical analysis was endorsed as a research method. In a certain
way, Plato had inherited the pre-Socratic naturalistic tradition, adopting it to his needs,
although without avoiding criticizing his illustrious predecessors, sometimes introducing
essential modifications of their teachings. Starting with the Academy, it became generally
accepted that language, a generic term that includes speech, logic and mathematics, reflects
the structure of the outside world. ‘Language’ and ‘form’ are the main terminological
ingredients of relevance to the philosopher’s inquiry into the fundamental constitution of
nature: he who knows how to speak, analyze, deduce, and compute, is master of his
environment and society.
The vocation of man as an intellectual quest was determined by Plato at the inceptual
moment of the post-Hellenic era. Later, it was totally absorbed into the modern Western
world during the anti-Aristotelian reaction of the Renaissance, which decided to return to
Plato [107], and the rise of the Baroque in seventeenth-century Europe [199]. This can be
seen very clearly in Galileo’s fine writings and his carefully composed scientific propaganda:
The book of nature is written in precise mathematical words, the language of the world is
(Euclidean) geometry, thinking is guided by observation (the role of perception) [200, 201].
On the other hand, Descartes had not only developed the actual mathematical language by
algebrizing geometry (the invention of analytic geometry in his great 1637 book Geometry
[202]), but even more went ahead and developed scientific methodology as such with explicit
focus on the extremely delicate manner in which minds interact with nature via the senses,
for example in Discourse on Method [202] and the Meditations [79]. Although Galileo’s
dialogues [200,201] are full of brilliant elaborations of the mechanism of the senses, especially
phenomenological seeing, it is Descartes who should take credits for founding modern scientific
epistemology and methodology.25
While each member of the philosopher-scientist pair Descartes and Galileo had written
in a very accessible and lucid prose style that remains unmatched in the history of letters, the
question now is this: Did this modern Cartesian common-sense philosophy provide a single
convincing justification of the quasi-religious credo that language reflects the structure of the
world? The answer is plain no.
For what is language as such? Consider the examples of the Greek language and
mathematics. The latter was handed down to Plato after centuries of development, first in
Mesopotamia and Egypt, then India and Hellenic world [204] (formal logic in particular was to
be developed shortly later by Plato’s pupil Aristotle.) The Greek language was influenced by
25It appears that this is also Heidegger’s view. To my best knowledge, throughout his voluminous
historical reflections on philosophy, Heidegger tend to concentrate on the figure of Descartes,
not Galileo, as the main founder of modernism and scientific methodology, see, for example,
[41,119,120,203].
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Egyptian and West Semitic cultures [205]. Both forms of language – Greek and mathematics
– can be considered, at that time, to be in a sufficiently advanced state of maturation:
They both had reached by Plato’s time sufficient stability in structure allowing for clear
and unambiguous expressions to circulate for use in widespread communication between
very different types of subjects. This observation, that effective communication of thoughts,
feelings, and findings using Greek and mathematics was already an established fact by the
time of Plato and the Academy, is an indication that the social character of the language
discourse had been already firmly established in the Greek lifeworld, and that ideology did
succeed in consolidating the linguistic sphere of communication, which first influenced Greek
philosophy itself (conducted using Greek and mathematics), then subsequently Idealism.
However, the point to be made here is not political but ontological. The form of
a language existing (and operational) in any social group is that complex developmental
outcome brought to the horizon of historical visibility through the ideological apparatus
of consciousness/unconsciousness, whether collective (pre-Augustine, pre-Descartes), or
personal (post-Christianity, post-seventeenth century). But if this consciousness (and its
logical expansion into unconsciousness) is not to be equated with the totality of nature, then
why should a “mere product of ideology” be taken as continuous with being per se?
The answer is this: Thinking and being are not the same unless idealism is to be accepted
as the de facto ontology of the world. (Destroying such a globalized version of Idealism is one
of the first tasks of event ontology and the philosophy of nature.) The interpretation of the
Parmenidean saying (‘thinking and being are the same’ [206]) should always be treated with
utmost care since we don’t know how the Greeks understood concepts such as Logos, Nous,
thinking [126,207,208]. Our modern background always intrudes, mixing in an unwarranted,
semiautomatic biased and one-sided interpretations, for example while reading Platonic texts
addressing introspection and the description of the thinking process [127, 209]. To be sure,
‘thinking’ as a cosmic expression of evolution and progress is itself thinkable [5,210,211], but
equating thinking and being on the basis of a thinking subject is an altogether different matter.
In a certain sense, the German Idealism of Schilling [212] and Hegel [213] foundered on
exactly this step: Although they railed against what they had taken as a personalistic bias in
Fichte’s system of transcendentalism [144,214], the actual model of their attempt to build an
ontological non-subjective Subject turned out eventually to be nothing but the psychological
data of ego-consciousness. Something similar happens all the time in philosophy: you meet
a profound thinker who deliberately strive to avoid the narrow constraints of the limited
human empirical subject only to fall back into the same trap toward the end (Hegel [213],
Husserl [90], Sartre [215], Merleau-Ponty [216,217], Gadamer [20], just to mention some key
figures.)
4.2. Idealism’s Ontologization of Consciousness
We seem to be facing the following dilemma: should the historical narrative start with
language or the ontology of consciousness? But if the former is produced by the ideological
apparatus of the latter, isn’t it possible to bypass all talk about the ego or the subject and
focus instead on logic, mathematics, and grammar? The last alternative appears to have
been the choice of many philosophers, most notably Heidegger who consistently attributes
subject ontology to the Cartesian Meditations [79]. Among the notable writers who opted for
a choice based on elevating consciousness to a cosmic level the most famous are Schilling and
Hegel, who actually were pioneers of inventing the historical method of doing philosophy.
In the aftermath of the dissolution of German Idealism, the cosmology of consciousness
became unpopular and even suspected of mysticism and speculative nonsense, Hegelianism
in particular described as wild and mad dogmatic edifice that has no roots in reality.26
26It is within this background that one may understand the celebrated movement ofmodernism and
the later so-called Linguistic Turn, the two are actually inseparable and deeply connected internally
at the “production phase” of ideology as will be explained in more details later.
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Therefore, even though most writers agree that the Greeks did not know a modern ego-
consciousness in the form of free individual subject, they converge on a parallel story about
the intellect, Logos, nous, mind, and so on, all are terms addressing complex notions grappling
with (yet unclear) understanding of order, chaos, motion, creation, annihilation, light, reason,
eternity, and similarly. According to this second story, the Greek world did have a formal
structure encapsulated in its speech and mathematics.27 These formal elements provided the
first elaboration of a theory of being in the pre-Socratic schools and constituted the sum total
of knowledge that was handed down to Plato and his followers. They are not typically viewed
as part of any epistemological setting since – here – the concept of knowing subject is not
assumed to be to have existed yet. This is probably one of the motivations behind Heidegger’s
infatuation with early Greek philosophy, for he sees here ‘thinking about being in its purest
form’ just before the subsequent contamination of metaphysics with the ego or subject of
Augustine and Descartes, followed by the later resurgence of transcendental philosophy.
However, it remains questionable whether any formal element can really be taken as “pure”
without full phenomenological elucidation. The way Heidegger selected Greek elements and
subjected them to meticulous – and in many occasions almost otherworldly – analysis cannot
simply be considered the normal mode of exposition in the history of philosophy. The truth
is this: most commentators deal with the formal in the Greek lifeworld (let us call it here the
ancient Logos) in a manner emphasizing the lawful structure of the discourse. What is formal
is that which can be subsumed under a law. Obedience to strict order or rule following are
here the essences of the common understanding of Logos. In the good will of a scholar writing
about the Greek lifeworld lurks the desire to see something different from our modern world
with its quantum physics, symbolic logic and computing machines, leading to the desire to
envelope the ancient formal with meanings and system of valuations beyond what we can
see in ourselves now. But the ultimate outcome is that the scholarly account almost always
ends up rediscovering how close we are after all to Greek concepts. The concepts of number
and geometrical form, harmony and propositions, measurement and prediction, had been
all in circulation in the Pythagorean and post-Pythagorean Platonic eras. The modes of
expressions are different, no doubt, but this is mainly because the social and technological
nature of the ancient and modern world dictates problems of contrasting values. At the end,
eventually, the ancient formal turns out to be the background of the modern formal. The
continuity, in our view, is a direct result of the fact that the same ontological genesis was at
stake in both cases: the ideological apparatus working under a hidden (ancient) and explicit
(modern) ontology of consciousness producing the language device or machine. The birth of
the formal in the ancient world is one of the earliest signs of the victorious breakthrough of
ego-consciousness in the human being.
The ordering of our public knowledge of speech in the form of grammar is the start of
the decline of language and its departure from the ethereal Heideggerian state, the “house of
being” [218,219]. The formalization of the mathematical by the Hilbert program [220,221] is
similarly the signal of the end of the highest form mathematics has attained at the hands of
Cantor [222,223], Klein [224,225], and Russell [226]. The writing of a state constitution is the
sure sign that an autonomous collective body, the Jasperian mass [227], has taken hold of the
human group. Formalization and the imposition of rules is a degeneration and fall from the
edenic heights of immediate being into the tyranny of reflection and intermediate knowledge,
mediated interventions by others and the building up of nested circles and convoluted tracks
culminating in the trap of self existence, auto-genesis of form, transcendental God, and
all other formulas for living and thinking that have been in full currency throughout the
last ten thousands years of the history of human civilization [228, 229]. To quote Deleuze,
the “royal way” goes through axiomatization [8]; and in our view, this is precisely the
dreaded domination of our lifeworld by authoritarian systems of rules created by the capitalist
ideological apparatus in order to serve a weakened, de-centered whole: a blind, free-floating
27And maybe the embryonic methodology of natural science which however had to wait Aristotle
for its full initial clear articulation.
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mass of robotized labor force, exactly as prophesied (in the political and cultural spheres) by
Marx [230], Nietzsche [231], and Simmel [232].
The law is a rule to be followed always for the sake of other. The concept of law and the
idea of the other are organically connected. This is why the emergence of the paradigm of
natural law in the pious seventeenth century had always been related to the problem of the
existence of God [199]. The century of science now introduced a new meaning for Deity in
contrast to the falling Medieval world. God is the absolute other to whom the lawfulness of
the rules of nature must be contrasted. This very mechanism of law and other is an advanced
stage of the growth of ego-consciousness and represents the solidification of new forms of
power and control in the intellectual and cultural space. It is then not incidental to notice that
Descartes started a very conspicuous movement in mathematics: algebraization [202]. The
first outcome, analytic geometry, was a great success, but Galileo did something very similar
when he converted temporality into time measurement [200, 201]. Algebra is ‘the science of
rules and their manipulations’ [233] so by disclosing a hidden algebraic structure the modern
mind rejoices in frenzied intoxication since he has stumbled on the ultimate method for
controlling the object under his gaze. The arithmetization of space (geometry) and dynamics
(time measurement) is the outcome of the combined efforts several creative minds living in the
first half of the seventeenth century, with the main credits going to writers such as Viete [233],
Fermat, Gassendi, Descartes [202], and Galileo [200, 201]. In the twentieth century, modern
mathematics has drifted into the Cartesian-Galilean arithmetization/measurement project
under the influence of Weyl and his followers, and it is safe to say that the hallmark of the
post-World War period (“American Mathematics”) is the increasing tendency to dominate
mathematical knowledge by algebrizing everything possible.28 The idea of law revisited by
Kant in his critical philosophy is the direct and explicit formulation of such tendency. By
grounding both concepts and acts in a priori laws and imperatives, the other, as an ontological
category, was displaced from the seventeenth century’s God into the new rising alternative:
the modern bourgeoisie man and his philosophical dressing as a Cartesian-Kantian subject
[109, 118, 148, 160]. Thus, underneath the most formalistic consideration, there always lies
hidden a dominant pole silently enshrouding the whole abstract space of abstract calculations,
injecting “meaning” and semantic values into what would be otherwise empty manipulations of
discursive conceptual and symbolic elements. This silent dominant pole, whether Foucault’s
Gaze [237,238], Deleuze and Guattari’s Black Hole [8], or the Jasperian mass [227], is nothing
but a lingering shadow of the Despotic Signifier of ego-consciousness [191] supplying the
body social with its lawful order, complete with its complimentary necessary other, hence
regulating the formal (social) game in a way not much different from its earliest manifestations
in recorded history [25] and the later ancient Greek world [208].
We have found that the Platonic project of constructing our understanding of the
world on the basis of language (mainly, Greek and mathematics) represents – in a quite
convoluted way that is not fully understood yet – one of the earliest forms of the ontology
of consciousness, which swept through the disintegrating Hellenic world after Aristotle and
later metamorpisized into Western Christianity then modern philosophy (Descartes, Hume,
Kant, Hegel.) How such conclusion can be be made fully explicit in terms of the formal
elements of speech and mathematics is beyond the scope of this paper but will be addressed
in future more specialized publications. It is nothing less than a complete reconsideration of
syntax, semantics, mathematics, logic, effectively launching a new critique of the foundations
of formal ontology in the wake of Heidegger’s contributions to the problem.
28This is the new term for ‘axiomatizing’. Category theory as the last attempt so far to implement
the Hilbert program [234]. Saunders Mac Lane, co-founder of the theory, was much influenced by
the Göttingen school in general, and Hilbert and Weyl in particular [235]. In his book on classical
groups [236], Weyl advocates that algebra should be understood as a discourse extending measurement
via numbers into measurement via new algebraic structures (still modeled on the abstract properties
of numbers.) It is admirable that Weyl always thinks about mathematics in connection with the
study of nature, but we cannot accept his philosophical presupposition of idealism.
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But our main endeavour here is not a relapse back to yet another form of critical
philosophy like Kantianism [60, 84] or the Frankfort School [160]. The fruitfulness of all
manners of negative dialectics can be verified in, we believe, is the failure of Adorno’s
metaphysical project [116], the opportunism of Habermas [239], and the hidden ideological
bias of Kant and neo-Kantianism [108, 109].29 After following the very different approach
to the problem of ideology taken up by Foucault in the shadow of Althusser, there is also
the chance of examining the extraordinary career of the Deleuzeo-Guattarian social ontology
of Capitalism and Schizophrenia [8, 25, 190, 191]. Such themes will be integrated in details
into our future positive contribution to fundamental ontology and also the critique of formal
ontology initiated by Heidegger. For the time being, our main intention here is to illuminate
this general orientation by selecting event ontology as the vantage point of the whole historico-
philosophical inquiry.
However, even after – or in spite of – our recognition of the ontological role played by
ideology in the formation of language, the actual details of how consciousness emerged into the
scene remains as an unsolvable enigma as before. Since the so-called inert matter, inorganic
substance, inanimate entities are what are typically taken to constitute the “neutral” mode
of existence in the world, the disturbing fact that something radically different like mind or
soul lies side by side with the “passive” dimension of being-there deeply troubled the Greeks
long before the invention of the notorious solution known as Cartesian dualism. Aristotle’s
De anima [240], probably one of the greatest philosophical texts of all time, is essentially
an attempt to solve the problem in a radically new way. The outcome of this mesmerizing
book was that, strictly speaking, consciousness is nothing, not in the sense of being an
‘epiphenomenon’, to use a currently popular expression, but literally “nothing special” because
it is already infused with the deepest structure of being itself: potentiality, i.e., the very
latent possibility for the actualization of potentials as such. This answer (which tacitly
equates perception with consciousness) did not make Nature much easier to comprehend
than before, but it fired up the imagination of some of the best minds throughout history
such as Plotinus [104], Avicena [241], Averroes [242–244], Leibniz [10], and Heidegger [18,30].
But before entering the battlefield of proper ontology, which will occupy us for the rest of
this paper and future ones, it is probably convenient to stop for a while and reflect on how
the question of the emergence of consciousness was conceived before.
As discussed above, starting with Plato and the Academy, it was starting to be realized
that the structure of the mind reflects (not refracts) the reality of the actual world. Besides
the usual interpretation of the Ideas as perfect templates for the construction of the real, one
may view the introduction by Plato of such ethereal, highly abstract “concept-objects” as a
technical solution for the problem of knowing and perception in the following version:
knowing perception = being.
This idealistic interpretive ontological prescription, which is neither true nor original, sheds
some light on how the disconcerting lack of solid ground for establishing the celebrated
isomorphism between mind and nature did not prevent the deliberate invention of such
isomorphic correspondence in the form of a third world, the universe of the Platonic Ideals,
which serves, epistemologically speaking, as a mediator between the embryonic germ of the
subject (mind) and the corresponding germ of the object (nature.) It is indeed the Idea that
transfers reality into the images formed via sense perception by ascribing “objectivity” to the
latter but in the inferior state of a copy qua the defective mode of bare similitude to the
original perfect design laid safely in the absolute realm of this third sphere [31,245].
Platonism, like Cartesianism, is a variant of that notorious species of contemplation
known as ‘common sense philosophy’. It is therefore no great surprise to see here how the
example of the craftsman and the maker of tools and things, the artisan of the Athenian state,
29Ironically, the latter project (neo-Kantianism) was masterfully dissected by the Hegelian Adorno
himself [118,148,161]!
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supplied the aristocratic Platonic academician with the bread and butter of his philosophical
resolution: the making of things according to designs conceived in advance, the ideal form
toward which real, perceived objects comport themselves in the cosmic endeavour of being
and becoming.30 Sensed-being becomes object only through the Idea of objecthood, which is
neither exactly the sensed nor the final perceived object, but a most noble “third party” that
transcends the two major Kantian players, intuition and concept.
4.3. Idealism and the Object
We can see then that explicating the genesis of the concept of object had been the
essential content of Plato’s theory of Ideas. Common-sense philosophies, mainly Platonism,
Cartesianism, British Empiricism, Kantianism, Hegel’s theory of essences, Husserl, and
modern mathematical physics (Weyl, orthodox quantum mechanics, general relativity, neo-
Darwinism), are all different solutions of basically the same problem formulated very carefully,
for the first time, by the Platonic Academy in Athens. Here the existence of the object is
posed as a problematic pole that should be explained away by generating a certain body
of philosophical analysis. For example, empiricism strives for a solution that grounds
objecthood in direct experience, which is expressive and relational [42]. Kant, on the
other hand, goes a bit further and suggests that the concept of object must be based not
on experience itself, but the structure of experience [84]. Hegel’s concept of essence in
Logic [213] is a direct development of the Kantian key idea of invariance-in-multiplicity,
while Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology [90,91] and Weyl’s group-theoretic relativistic
invariance [179,246] are very close to the same Kantian core.31
It is, after all, the signature trait of modernism that the grounding of objecthood has
been sought in a strange, fluid, and fuzzy structure called ego-consciousness resembling
nothing we may observe in the world of “real objects out there.” The paradoxical
import of this fundamental discursive transformation passed unnoticed by early modern
Western thinkers, with the exception of Spinoza and Leibniz in the seventeenth century
[159, 178, 199, 247]. In the twentieth century, the most important critics of the dogma of the
subject were Carl Jung [192,193,248] and Heidegger [18,249]; Russell and Bergson [1,250,251]
(Whitehead as a synthesis of Russell and Bergson); Foucault [245, 252] and Deleuze [31, 43]
(Althusser as an imaginary mediator between Foucault and Deleuze and a seer for both.)
The combined effort of their titanic undertakings have now convinced us of the fatal flaws
of the philosophical program of idealism, particularly the specific modernist solution given
under the guise of a subject modeled on ego-consciousness.
The noted “ontological incongruence” of the philosophical concept (subject) on one hand,
and the psychological basis of ego-consciousness on another, seems to have been grasped in a
fundamentally correct manner by Jung [192, 193] although he did not couch his criticism of
Freud’s personal unconscious in philosophical terms [253–256]. It is also possible to include
Bergson’s thinking in this direction if the ‘intellect’ severely attacked throughout his main
writings [1] can be associated with a form of reason or mind developed in the wake of the
Enlightenment and its canonical Cartesian heritage. On the other hand, Russell himself has
been always critical of Descartes and Kant, consistently avoiding both naive and sophisticated
theorization about consciousness. The system of Whitehead combined the best of Bergson
and Russell in a unified edifice where feelings and perception where detached from their
contingent human carrier and ascribed to the totality of being. Following the grand critique
of metaphysics by Heidegger, both Foucault and Deleuze developed, via very distinct modes of
research, the nonhuman forms of philosophical experience deliberately designed for displacing
the center of ontological seeing from the subject to nature itself. All these directions of
30Cf. Heidegger’s destructive construction of this history of Platonism in [41].
31If the parameters of this epistemological problem are to be rigoursly fleshed out by means of
a traditional metaphysical jargon, then we may invoke term-pairs such as permanence and change,
being and becoming, the one and the many, and so on.
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thought will be explored and further expanded in future works by the author.
In the history of subject ontology, the conviction that the ultimate roots of that
philosophical elaboration aiming at unlocking the secret of objecthood as such must be
located at the level of the ego-consciousness pole had lead, quite naturally, since Descartes
and via Locke, Berkeley, Hume, culminating in Kantianism, to the notorious concept of
phenomena, one of the most confusing and misleading terms in the history of Western
thought. The direct meaning conveyed here is “appearing,” and hence the connection with
the seeing function exercised by an agent, the subject. ‘Phenomena’ implies the manner of
showing itself or the inner possibility of disclosure in the world. Framed in nonsubjective
language, the phenomenal should really be interpreted as the enactment of a fully-fledged
relational dynamics within the unique zone of interaction confronting the organism and
environment. However, throughout its history, the term had been employed in multifarious
modes of expressions; not infrequently, different usages implied contradictory conclusions and
results.32 Since idealism puts the focus on the knowing subject, the systematic deployment of
the expression ‘phenomena’ blends smoothly with the reductive manner in which the world
according to this philosophy is referred back to ego-consciousness, the latter viewed as a
“center of emanation” legitimizing existence itself by the use, or rather abuse, of the theory
of objecthood.
In Idealism, We don’t have the object-in-itself, but instead its bundle of associated modes
of appearing, or zones of visibilities, perpetually forming, fading, and getting extinguished,
then popping out again, all amid the continuous perspectival flux of subjective experience.
However, “reason” desperately looks amid this madness of permanent change for a permanent
nonchange, fixedness, or constancy. The dialectic of change and rest has been a revered
recurrent theme in philosophy since the dawn of human civilization, in fact probably going
back to the earliest formations of primitive religions and mythologies. The Greeks had
certainly mastered the problem using the pregnant power of their philosophically rich native
language and handed it down to Plato who transformed the topic into a central tenet of his
thinking (and consequently ours.)
4.4. The Adumbration of the Real
The modernist turn, Kantianism, presents the onset of the search for a solution that is formal
and relational. In a style of thinking dominated by the ego’s vantage point, the inherent
multiplicity of appearing – characteristic of perception as such – was elevated into the status
of the “stuff” of reality, while the essence of the object was bracketed and taken as the
ultimate unknown X, the residual effect remaining after “performing” all possible modes of
perspectival adumbrations, to use a favorite Husserlian terminology [87–92]. The subject acts
by performing this necessary change of perspective. ‘Change’ here symbolizes variability in
manifestation within the ego-consciousness’s experience, and hence phenomena are generated
by the multiplicity of angles, sides, views throughout which the unknown X let itself be given
to the subject. But how do we get a unified “thing” out of this flux of change? It is here we
find the Kantian signature of the solution, the theory of reason, intellect, or the cognitive core
of the human mind. Kantianism attributes to the subject a forming power capable of fixing
the violent stream of multiplicity of appearances and eventually creating a static object, a
thing. Dynamics is overcome and a static conception of the world is enthroned. The technical
apparatus of this fixing process is the theory of categories that Kant borrowed from Aristotle
and logic. Formalization then takes precedence over the relational dynamic dimension of
modernism by ascribing to the psychological process of judgement an ontological status.
Eventually, the global picture of the world constructed by the Kantianism of Kant and
32The Heideggerian project of the destruction of the history of Western metaphysics contributed
significantly to clarifying the context and meaning of such innocently-looking words such as object,
phenomena, and world, and how they are entangled with ideology, although the last term is not used
by Heidegger.
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Husserl boils down to two classes of concepts, phenomena and ego-consciousness. The world
is essentially a cluster of appearances and views that become comprehensible only in relation
to that enigmatic, inexhaustible central pole of knowing-perception. Phenomena, according
to this view, are nature, and the study of the “real” world is reduced to the organization
of our knowledge of the structure of happenings “out there” as they reveal themselves to us
through measurement. Consequently, the Galilean celebration of observation and experiment
is in perfect harmony with the new transformation of philosophical thinking distinguishing
modernism, incidentally explaining the hostility of modern science to the scholastic concept
of substance. According to the mainstream understanding of this problematic term, the
substantial persists in existence without anything else, in particular, it does not need
a knowing subject to appropriate its ownmost being. In direct contrast to substance,
phenomena are what is nothing in itself except that it comes into life only through interaction
with ego-consciousness. Nature is then equated with some “proper residue” obtained
by processing phenomena using the intellectual apparatus of mind, most prominently
mathematics and empirical observation. This completes in Kantianism the bifurcation into
nature and mind, no doubt an echo of the dualistic outlook inherited from Christianity and
Descartes. Although the parallelism between the two pairs of bifurcations, nature/mind and
phenomena/ego-consciousness, is not straightforward, the salient feature of this historical
presentation of the genesis of the modernist (now dominant) conception of the world
follows closely the idealistic core implicated by the ideological apparatus of perception and
introspection, which also generates the classical subject/object structure and its numerous
offsprings and offshoots. By reflecting nature through the mirror of mathematical physics
and its concomitant doctrine of measurement, a form of personal consciousness was infused
into the totality of external things under the dangerous label of ‘phenomena.’ While the new
science was openly combating anthropomorphism, a personal, certainly subjective, element
was smuggled back into nature under the guise of methodology : experimental observation
and the paradigm of Euclidean geometry (geometrization of nature.)33
From the perspective of event ontology and its critique of Idealism, the most fundamental
methodological principle in Kantianism is the following:
Kantianism: The real is not the phenomenal, but what remains after subtracting
or bracketing all perspectival fluctuations and variations of visibility.
But whereto an unchecked application of such maxim takes us now? Nothing less ambitious
than the modernist theory of essence par excellence, developed in various ways by Kant,
Hegel, neo-Kantianism, Husserl, mathematical physics (Weyl, Dirac, von Neumann, etc),
and still evolving up to date by others. We believe that the germs of this theory can be
traced back to the multiple interpretations of Plato’s dialogues known as Platonism, which
unfortunately have not been paying serious attention to the great efforts excreted by Aristotle
to combat this understanding of the popular writings of his teacher. There has been from
the beginning an emphasis on the “eye” and the way its owner, the human subject, views the
outside world by direct observation. Although Platonism is a fluid, unregulated, inarticulate
whole that is sometimes self-contradictory in character, there is, after all, a fundamental
priority, reserved by the Greeks in general, and Plato in particular, to the function of seeing.34
33As will be studied in details somewhere else, there is a very strong connection between ideology
and methodology. If we accept the proposal that idealism is one (ontological) outcome among
others created by the machination of the subject ideology [30, 249], then the entire affair of the
classical dualism of nature/mind utterly collapses, revealed in its true essence as not really a genuine
philosophical dilemma in the world of ideas after all, but rather a problem in the “meta-world” of the
production of ideas, something very different indeed. Highly theoretical concepts such as meta-world,
second-order world-historical concept formations, spaces of idea productions, etc, to be delimited
from within a rigorous ontological framework, are outside the scope of this paper. This is a very
interesting subject to explore that deserves more attention from philosophers working within the
continental tradition.
34Augustine would later expand the technique found in Platonism and Neoplatonism into the
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This apparently unremarkable personal trait of humans shared with many other animals
fascinated the ancient mind and provided the motivation for the unusual prominent position
played by optics, the science of light, in the evolution of intellectual history. Light, the
medium of seeing par excellence, is the carrier of knowledge and the generator of reality
as experienced in the perceptual orgy of perpetual daily life encounters. It also envelopes
the almost surreal nocturnal realm of our private sleep and dream spaces, making contact
with different worlds again through a mental eye that captures images of incorporeal beings.
Even the elusive spheres of fantasy and imaginations, different from both dreams and the
perceived, are exemplary visual meetings with self-created entities although belonging to
a distinct phenomenological category. This primordial precedence of seeing supplied the
context in philosophy for perception and then cognition. Hans Jonas (1966) writes:
Since the days of Greek philosophy sight has been hailed as the most excellent of
the senses. The nobelist activity of the mind, theoria, is described in metaphors
mostly taken from the visual sphere. Plato, and Western philosophy after him,
speaks of the “eye of the soul” and of the “light of reason.” Aristotle, in the first
lines of the Metaphysics, relates the desire for knowledge inherent in the nature of
all men to the common delight in perception, most of all vision ... Sight, in addition
to furnishing the analogues for the intellectual upperstrucutres, has tended to serve
as the model of perception in general and thus as the measure of the other senses.35
Now, how did this methodological preference for vision and the visual impact the theory
of essence? From seeing we now derive new “categories,” the visible and the invisible.
The philosopher’s artfulness resides in the subtle manner in which such seemingly banal
terminological issues can be turned into a serious theoretical edifice. What is the best model
to examine the philosophical problematization of seeing and vision?
In fact, it is in a place like Kant’s First Critique where one may find the best philosophical
model. Suppose a subject is facing something, a “thing” that is not yet a comprehensible
object, for objecthood is the very aim of the theory of essence. This “thing” is a source of
multiple rays of light, or the cause of sensations created internally within us while interacting
with the rays, waves, surfaces, etc, of the entity under consideration. Following the rules
of the realm within, intuition and intellect develop interpretations of the induced sensations
and attempt to build an overall conception of the thinghood of the thing. But how? Each
mode of seeing is at the same time a concrete mode of viewing the scene. In other words,
visual perception is inevitably connected with a perspective along which the knowing (now
the seeing) subject locates himself within an opening field of vision engulfing both the yet-
to-be-object of cognition and the carrier of the organ of seeing, the eyes.
Perspective presupposes a conception of space, hence we may appreciate the necessity of
ascribing the Kantian a priori structure of space into intuition itself. The spatial conditions
of the external world (distribution of surfaces, angles of incidence and reflection, diffraction
at the corners, luminosity, etc) interact with the spatial conditions of the internal world
(color perception, image unfolding, discrimination of shapes and outlines, etc) and lead to
the existence of multiple perspectives instead of a unique one. As is typical in philosophy
books, whether popular or sophisticated, the renowned example of the table serves as a
good demonstration of how the same entity appears differently under variable conditions of
illuminations.
Let us deal with a set of perspectives Pi indexed by i. For example, if there exists a
countable number of such modes, we speak of perspectives P1, P2, ..., etc. Each perspective
is connected with another, and possibly with all others, but the subject does not yet know
it. Kant [84], following Hume’s analysis [83], realized that the problem of establishing, with
apodictic certainty, a universal law regulating the complex manner of variability, suffered by
domain of introspection [95]. The model here is still the eye which describes through language
happenings hidden deep inside the soul.
35Jonas [257], page 135.
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all possible perspectives throughout the flux of dynamic experience, is in principle impossible.
He then changed the formulation of the problem itself: Instead of looking for a way in which
such a law can be established given the violent flux of seemingly disordered experience, Kant
posited that this very experience, on its own, is to be considered the product of an a priori
law regulating its various modes of unfolding; in a nutshell, this is the celebrated order of
intuition (aperception) that he famously called space and time.
The basic idea behind Idealism’s technical solution of the problem of seeing goes like
this:
(i) We don’t know what perspective P1 in itself is; we don’t know what perspective P2 in
itself is; and so on.
(ii) But the relation between these modes of seeing can be obtained by intellectual cognition,
in this case simply by changing the conditions of illumination in order to transform, for
instance, P1 into P2, and vice versa.
(iii) Next, even after establishing all these interrelations between the totality of Pi for all i,
we still don not know what the ‘relations’ are in themselves.36
(iv) It is precisely here where a leap of imagination comes to rescue: the thing-in-itself, the
relation-in-itself, the perspective-in-itself, are not important (later will be announced
unknowable), but what is truly significant for philosophy is the formal pattern of
connection between the elements of experience.
(v) The ‘object’ is merely the residue remaining after performing all the above mentioned
transformations between perspectives, the outcome of the dynamic process itself in which
the central pole of seeing, the subject, actively changes the conditions of viewing the
entity under consideration in order to reach a sort of collective compromise, a synthesis
of sensations and cogitations generating, from the teeming flow of phenomenal data and
perceptual stimuli, the very object as such.
(vi) Objecthood, then, deals with an unnameable X we posit after the performance of seeing
as analyzed above into its active components.
In this we meet one of the earliest arguments pointing to a relational dynamics in
philosophy, however this time not in nature itself but rather inside the knowing subject.
Kant shifted the problem of the object away from external reality and situated it instead
within the confines of an empirical ego, exactly in line with the Cartesian modernist heritage
as developed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. It is true that the German Kant did not want
to reduce the ultimate essences of reality to anything empirical like a personal contingent
ego, so he went into the laborious – never convincing – efforts, of hypostatising a sort of
abstract transcendental ego, the Kantian subject, who is the condition of possibility of the
empirical ego. This tedious procedure was never even detailed by Kant, but the attempt to
actually implement it was carried out by Husserl in a long series of investigations that were
not destined to materialize into conclusive results. The transcendental subject is essentially
an idea that Kant took from Western Christianity and its long theological metaphysics
of God in contrast to the immanence of nature. The subject, being transcendental or
empirical, is essentially a psychic being and hence belongs to applied ontology, a field or
region in nature where personal consciousness/uncoinsness managed to show its signs for
the first time in humans. In a certain sense, there is no fundamental ontological difference
between the empirical and transcendental subjects, both being modes of viewing the so-called
‘ego’ through introspection and techniques of observations sometimes modeled on perception
as in natural sciences. Husserl’s achievements suggests, convincingly in our opinion, that
perception-based methods are not adequate for the ontological task, and that the human
lifeworld, following Dilthy [14] and later influenced by Heidegger [18], is irreducible to the
36the problem of the being of the relations, which event ontology must solve. Nor the ‘thing’ as
such is known or knowable.
27
present-at-hand mode of concernful dealings with the surroundings encountered in daily life.
Instead, the phenomenological approach developed by Husserl goes back to the innovations
of Fichte, probably the real founder of modern phenomenology, who singlehandedly created
an entirely new “method of seeing” based on introspection and not perceptual cognition [197].
However, we should notice that Kant’s elusive formulation of the above embryonic
relational dynamics foundered from the beginning and was not able to evolve into the
philosophy of nature that Leibniz, in the privacy of his unpublished manuscripts, unknowingly
to Kant and most Kantians, had already taken into a very advanced stage starting from
Aristotle. The detailed story of Leibniz cannot be given here, but few additional remarks
are given below to complete our analysis of the concept of essence in Kantianism. This will
bring us into the fundamental concept of time and its subtle relation to dynamics.
4.5. Brief Remarks on Time and Temporality
By the ‘time of dynamics’ we don’t refer to time in the celebrated pair space and time
appearing in the transcendental aesthetics of the First Critique [84]. In addition to the fact
that the latter consolidated the lion’s share of scholarly and academic attention, very little is
said about the temporal dimension of experience, although such topic belongs to the core of
the Kantian canon. It was part of the legacy of Husserlian phenomenology and the people who
reacted to it, for example Heidegger and Weyl, that the notorious issue of temporality was
brought back to the picture. Heidegger’s book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics [203]
is probably the best account of dynamics in Kant. Its profound analysis of the obscure
doctrine of schema in Kant’s First Critique presents the most focused engagement with the
original impulse of Kantianism up to date. Unfortunately, the book was not fully appreciated
by immediate contemporaries like Cassirer, who (justly in my view) declared Heidegger’s
treatment as an overinterpretation [59]. However, the truth is that even if Heidegger’s book
put into Kantianism much more than what has been originally there, the fact remains that
the concept of essence (based on the technique of perception) does presuppose a deep concept
of temporality that is fundamentally lacking in the literature of idealism. The “temporality of
viewing” does not show up with sufficient depth in Husserl’s writings, although his program
is supposed to deal essentially with new analysis of the matter. Moreover, the tendency
initiated in Kant’s original writings to “freeze” the problem by constructing a static model of
a permanent essences was taken up and maintained in most subsequent Kantian literature,
including even Hegel. There has been an increasing tendency in the technical literature to look
at the phenomenon of ‘invariance-in-multiplicity’ as a static structure that does not involve
genuine temporal development. The Husserlian term ‘adumbration’ is designed exactly to
convey this meaning. Instead of examining the movement of fluctuating-appearing in itself,
idealism treats perspectival changes, created by the will in a fictitious manner, just as if they
constitute an integral part of the process of seeing per se. Why do things have to be like
that? Because Kant’s lack of understanding of Leibniz’ dynamism forced him to endorse a
“logical” approach to the problem even after grasping the roots of the dynamic process of
seeing. Kant did not want to study a process, but rather a fixation by the mind modeled on
consciousness following the exemplary accounts set in motion by Descartes but armed by the
formal apparatus of Leibniz mathematics.37
The distortion of the meaning of temporality in Kantianism has reached its peak in
the modern formulation of mathematical physics, especially following the relativity theory of
37Even Hegel’s famous “process philosophy” turned out to be an empty refashioning of hardcore
Kantian idealism. Although Hegel finds occasionally very original things to say about Kant in
particular and metaphysics in general, his thinking is constrained within narrow confines and the
straitjacket of logic and dialectics did not allow him to travel far enough, actually not even as far as his
mentor Fichte had done. In particular, we fundamentally disagree with Marcuse’s overinterpretation
of Hegel’s ontology [258] and consider the dynamism attributed to the Hegelian system there more in
line with Marcuse’s teacher Heidegger’s ontology than Hegel’s. For a penetrating critique of Hegel’s
metaphysics, see Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition [43].
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Einstein and Weyl. In the hand of the latter, the group-theoretic approach was applied to
reformulate the topic in a way that reflects how mathematicians usually think. Indeed, the
very fundamental concept of transformation group, discovered and rediscovered by many in
the nineteenth century, including Klein [225] and Lie [259], was elevated by Weyl [179, 246]
to the status of the first organizing principle of our knowledge of the natural world. A
transformation group acts on a space, transforming an object to another; for example, it
rotates a triangle, displaces a line, stretches a figure, etc. However, no explicit awareness of
the temporal aspect of this transformation process itself is taken into consideration. Even in
the special cases where “time” is injected into the picture, for example, the concept of one-
parameter group of transformation [260], we still don’t find an adequate philosophical and
conceptual treatment of the subject in the mathematical literature. It seems that the very
process of applying a transformation by operating on its domain of definition is still taken by
the majority of mathematicians as a mental act whose inner structure’s theory is not a big
concern for science. For example, if we consider the idea of a symmetry group [261], we find
something very similar to the Kantian concept of essence. The possibility of applying the
elements of the symmetry group of the figure is taken for granted, and it is only the emerging
invariant structure, obtained after performing the totality of all those possible symmetry
operations (transformations), what counts as the “essence of the figure” (its “symmetrical
form.”)
There is no doubt that all elements are utterly confused in this Weylian version
of “dynamical Kantianism”: logic, empirical experience, metaphysics, epistemology, and
physics. Behind the entire scene lurks the ideological factor guiding the overall intellectual
effort by bridging its contradictions and filling the inevitable gaps. For what is this
“reason” but a shadow of ideology created by the Enlightenment thinkers for causes that
are essentially social, collective, and intersubjective? One can never find in Kant’s books or
Husserl’s voluminous writings any conclusive proof that something ontologically coherent and
fundamentally apodeictic or logico-formal can be found at the core of the ego-consciousness
pole’s temporal structure. Instead, we merely encounter powers attributed to the subject.
Or, in the Hegelian reinvention of Kantianism, a positing of what the philosopher sees in
ego-consciousness. By attributing and positing, ideology discreetly works its way through
the theoretical architectonic of the thinker, erecting a system of propositions and analytical
statements loosely organized around the fantastic/fanatic theme of ego-consciousness and the
delirium of its imagined centrality in every discourse.38
4.6. The Strange Figure of Underground Fichte
A first serious departure from Kantianism can be found in Fichte’s work interpreted
in an anti-transcendental fashion. Although he himself kept the signature Kantian
terminology circulating in his philosophical system, the essence of Fichte’s method remains
phenomenological and introspective. In this sense, he departs from Kant who based his
formal thinking on the ideology of perception (the transcendental aesthetics.) However, the
real genius of Fichte is the technical details of his dense and complex argumentative prose,
while the “results” themselves appear to us of minor ontological value. His work can now be
judged – as with Husserl’s phenomenology [90, 92] and the later Wittgenstein [262, 263] – a
contribution to philosophical psychology and cognitive psychology, rather than philosophy
and metaphysics. The approach is in fact immanent, not transcendental. Nowhere else
do we find a strict “derivational” mode of presenting philosophy other than in Fichte, not
38An ironic observation suitable at this juncture is the need to start studying Critical Philosophy
itself in a historico-critical fashion aiming at disclosing the very complex sociocultural process
dominated by systems of ideology shaping the discourse of thinking and controlling its production and
reproduction. Idealism is a generative system that has its own political economy and peculiarities,
which may prove not much different from capitalism as seen nowadays. A second-order ironic
observation: Adorno, who is typically considered one of the greatest critical philosophers of the
twentieth century, is a fanatic – though no orthodox – Hegelian, appearances to the contrary!
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even Hegel’s Logic [213] or Heidegger’s Being and Time [18]. Although he expounded an
introspective phenomenological reading of the subject’s inner consciousness, the manner in
which the mechanisms of cognition, seeing, induction, are disclosed throughout this reading
manifests a deep grasp of the process of dynamics in nature going far beyond Kant’s First
Critique and probably surpassed only by Heidegger. There is no Hegelian dialectic in the real
“official” sense of the word, but rather a world of virtual fields and continual actualization of
the latent dynamic possibility of the soul. This is why Fichte’s thinking appears to us closer
to the Aristotle of De Anima [240] than the canonical idealist figure of Descartes [78,79].39
In Fichte, the exact significations of most terms familiar in the discourse of idealism, such
as freedom, force, feeling, concept, will, etc, are rigoursly rederived on a basis that resembles
nothing in the Kantian text itself. With Kant everything is presupposed when it comes to the
definition of the main concepts with which he operates [143,264–266]. Not so with Fichte, who
in [197] provided a truly “dynamic deduction” of all the concepts based on movement, motion,
change, potentiality, which parallels the treatments of Aristotle and Leibniz. The concepts of I
and the Other are not hypostatized and concretized in advance as in Schelling and Hegel, who
exploited his “results” for their own philosophical program, but in fact re-imagined based on
new foundations: instead of dealing with a Cartesian subject, the phenomenological method
begins with an abduction based on introspection: the movement or perpetual dynamics of the
mind is taken – ontologically speaking – to represent a “model” of something more originary:
the ‘virtual/actual’ couple, termed in his text ‘determinable/determined’. Although this is
by no means always clear in Fichte’s lectures and books, careful reading reveals a work that
– in spite of its self-restriction to the empirical sphere of the psyche – remains extraordinary
fresh and relevant even today, and especially for the project of event ontology.
Some might find it strange to associate the name of Fichte with a philosophical narrative
ending with event ontology and postmodernism. After all, isn’t it true that German Idealism
had completely bypassed Fichte in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Hegelian system
since the mid 1830s? The real story of Fichte, the underground anti-Kantian dog, has not
been told yet, and we are not going to attempt one here. However, there is something more
enigmatic and troublesome in the line of investigation going back to early Greek philosophy.
The late Greek thought of Aristotle gave rise to the profound conjuncture that being is
potential being, and that the so-called “possible,” understood here as an interpretation of
‘potentiality,’ is more than a pure fiction invented by a cognitive subject in his quest to
understand the world. Later antiquity and the classic age both grappled very seriously with
problems of ontology initiated by the recovered Aristotelian manuscripts, and this interest in
the ontology of the “possible” in contrast to the “actual” had been very much alive throughout
the middle ages in the Western intellectual world, both the Arabic and Latin literature.40
It is one of the many enduring Descartes legacies that the founder of modern philosophy
was able to shake off the venerated earlier tradition and entirely change the orientation
of philosophical thinking by rejecting the so-called “system of Scholastic Aristotelian
metaphysics,” in particular the ontologies of potentiality, energy, actualization, and so
on. Indeed, such categories of ontological meaning were deemed “unworthy of a scientific
metaphysics” based on direct observation of nature. In outline, the main thrust of Descartes’
and Galileo’s efforts had been to shift the focus away from the medieval preoccupation
with explanation to the modernist interest in description. The goal of science is to record
the facts of the world, to jubilantly document the radiant “visible truth” emanated by the
beings inhabiting this world, a process that prides itself in accuracy, rigour, and precision,
39Fichte himself, being a child of the Enlightenment, might not like such evaluation, preferring to
be “publically” aligned with Plato and the “progressive” Descartes.
40The Hellenic culture was the foundation of the rich and sophisticated philosophical medieval
traditions prospering in both Europe and the Middle East/Central Asia throughout the extraordinary
five-hundred-year period 900-1400 AD [267–269]. Greek was the main literary and administrative
language in the Middle East for about a thousand years, only displaced by Arabic after the sudden
rise of Islam in the seventh century AD [270].
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denouncing ‘profundity’ and ‘depth’ as rhetorical redundancies not needed in a pragmatic
approach to nature concerned essentially with “results” and “outcomes.”
At exactly this point, the strange appearance of the underground writings of Fichte
disrupts the flow of our story, for in building an ontology of the human psyche based on
the determinable/determinate, or the virtual/actual, Fichte did reintroduce into Idealism the
element in Leibniz that Kant intentionally avoided in his fundamental work: The Aristotelian
dimension of being as dynamic possibility. Kant in fact kept the term ‘possible’ but totally
changed its meaning. ‘Possibility’ in Kant no longer means ontological potentiality (Aristotle)
or virtuality (Bergson, Heidegger, Simondon, Deleuze), but rather the vacuous concept of the
logical potential as manifested in cognitive processes taking their course inside the human
subject, i.e., a Cartesian Ego. Kantian possibility is something that can be understood only
with respect to us. Outside the intellect, there are no possibilities, but only hard truths
or rigid facts. But since – according to Kant – the object is not comprehensible without a
priori conditions of possibility making it graspable for a mind, ‘possibility’ now enters into
metaphysics as a key term but only in the way it departs from the original Aristotelian
understanding of ‘being as something more fundamental than a subject or a process of
subjectification.’
After his groundbreaking lecture course on ontology [197], Fichte continued to work
within the recently-discovered domain of transcendental and empirical psyches [198], but the
formal methods he developed were much more original than the orthodox Kantianism of
Descartes and Kant. Hegel would later exploit Fichte’s results but eventually he returned to
the modernist dogmatic dualistic pre-assumptions of subject and object (plus their dialectic
[213]) taken as fundamental starting point [271]. Even though Hegel never reduced objects to
Subject (in fact Kant never did that too), the overall inclination of the Hegelian imagination
toward metaphysics was essentially psychological and subjective in nature. The founder of
German Idealism, Fichte, was never surpassed by his famous pupil Hegel.
4.7. Will, Flow, and the Ontology of the Real
The emergence of a first truly postmodernist conception of reality can be traced back to the
metaphysics of Schopenhauer [272, 273] when interpreted as the immediate reaction of Late
Modernism to the rise and fall of German Idealism. The decline of interest in Schopenhauer,
characteristic of our time, is well known though hard to understand. The startling rise of
Nietzsche to philosophical and cultural stardom not only managed to wipe out the short-
lived universally-acclaimed reputation of Schopenhauer as the greatest Western philosopher
in the post Napoleonic world, but even worse tended to obscure the origins of many of the
fundamental philosophical concepts swarming through the space of the present world of ideas.
The Jungian concept of the unconscious as a cosmic nonpersonal desire [192, 193] finds its
root in Schopenhauer’s Will. Nietzsche’s Will to Power [231, 274] is unthinkable without
Schopenhauer’s famous concept of pervasive will-to-life.
An ontological model of nature inspired but not based on the human psyche can be
found first in the work of Schopenhauer, not Hegel, though in embryonic form. To make
things even worse, Heidegger, who rarely expressed personal judgements on other established
philosophers, maintained a consistently negative attitude toward Schopenhauer, whom he
did not even acknowledge as a fellow thinker. We will not enter here into a historiographical
analysis of the reasons or motivations behind this decline of the status of Schopenhauer in the
twentieth century. It is probably enough to mention that nowhere can we find an attack on
academic philosophy as powerful and serious as in Schopenhauer, not even Nietzsche. This
might partially explain the matter, since most philosophers tend to rely on the university
institution, their life-support system, which means they cannot criticize it in a direct manner.
Moreover, Schopenhauer’s relaxed method of writing, which mixes personal opinions with
simplified prose exposition of complex problems, tends to alarm “professional” philosophers
who usually like to think of themselves as hard-working folks struggling for the composition
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of every passage. But, strangely, Nietzsche – who inherited this very same style from
Schopenhauer – has not been equally condemned by his commentators for the same reasons.
The history of philosophy written in the future will require a new way of interpreting the
Schopenhauer-Nietzsche relation, effectively transcending the current oversimplified version.
Nothing like this will be provided here, anyway. After this brief digression, we plunge directly
into the heart of our topic.
Will is a flow. It is a formative power of creation that can be expressed in myriad
forms and various shapes. The Will is a force, or better still, a field of power relations as we
will find out later (Foucault.) In Schopenhauer (and Nietzsche), the Will is understood in a
metaphysical, nonpersonal sense where it does not refer to any concrete given or a quantum
of feeling as in Kantianism. Schopenhauerean Will can be compared with the Greek flux of
becoming (Heraclitus, Aristotle, Epicures.) During the process of nature enacted through
the Will, there is a perpetual metamorphoses of being into beings called objectification. Jung
would later develop a parallel concept for psychology, individuation. Both objectification
and individuation will be taken up later by Simondon and Deleuze. Will as the abstract
but fully real principle of formation (virtual field), while objectifcation/individuation is the
process of actualization of the virtual by building observable strata of the real, the visible,
the sayable, the voiced and touched, and so on. This is why causality in Schopenhauer has a
wider meaning than the narrow understanding found in modern physics and mainstream
mathematics. Similar to Russell [3], causality for Schopenhauer signifies an ontological
structure of diagrammatic connectivity (Pierce [275], Guattari [276], Deleuze [8]), a “method”
without a user, a practice enacted in the absence of a practitioner. Causality is not the
underlying structure of a pregiven “law of nature,” but the fountainhead of reality itself is
causality understood dynamically as the giving out of phenomena in the form of objectified
being. To be sure, with Schopenhauer we are still not totally disconnected from his idols
Plato and Kant: deep occupation with the Cartesian subject and the mechanics of appearing,
as manifested in the notorious term ‘phenomena’, remain with us in Schopenhauer’s system;
but the first decisive step needed to break away from Kantianism was already taken here.
Later on, Russell will formalize the process of nature by providing mathematical philosophy
as the basis for an ontology of nature, and Whitehead (influenced by Bergson) will take care
of the ontology of life. But when it comes to who started with challenging the ontological
centrality of the subject-hood when the latter is understood based on models derived from
the personal mind, the important initial attempt’s credits, we believe, must be traced back
to Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
Both Wagner [277] and Nietzsche [97,278] understood the deep significance of the break
with idealism initiated by Schopenhauer and unhesitatingly chose to follow the lead. So why
did everybody forget the name of Schopenhauer in our history books? Certain shortcomings
and problems in Schopenhauer’s text are to blame for that. His lack of interest in the writing
process itself is another factor. But, most importantly, because his main ontology was passed
almost unchanged into the late writings of Nietzsche, even while the ethical philosophy was
rejected. But did the Stoic outlook of Schopenhauer go unnoticed because of its lack of
originality or for other reasons? We are not so sure about the ultimate status of Nietzsche’s
and Deleuze’s life affirming philosophies. We don’t know if the metaphysical optimism of their
thinking will stand the test of the times. Although the vast majority of great philosophers
were indeed optimists, that does not mean that there are very good reasons to be an optimist
as person. The case of Schopenhauer is not yet closed. Neither that of Wagner.
Leibniz had developed a dazzling panorama of thinking, a vast landscape of theories
and concepts later condensed into a very compact form published under the broad banner
‘monadology’ [10]. We cannot so easily compare Leibniz and Schopenhauer. The former
was an “atomist,” the latter universalist: global, and “all-encompassing,” provided one does
not romanticize the terminology. The Will is a universal force. The monads are local:
a fundamental rupture in the whole shattering Being into a mosaic of infinite little tiny
beings. The Will is the Jungian Unconscious, the collective libido of nature fueling the
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advance and decline of history. But with the monads, Leibniz will struggle in vain to re-insert
totality, a sense of the globally-absolute Being, God or Desire, whatever you like, so that no
eventual fragmentation of reality can be held responsible of the observable consequences of
life. Boscovich followed Leibniz’s lead and developed an ontology of nature based on atomic
beings lying at the bottom of the phenomenal world [279]. The story became dynamic,
not physically, but ontologically. Boscovich is the new prophet of postmodern physics and
mathematics who is yet to be unearthed. Nietzsche, of course, did read Boscovich [280], and
hence his famous ontology of Will to Power. Schopenhauer did not atomize Being. Nietzsche
had done so. This is why the latter is deservedly a larger-than-life figure. For with Nietzsche
the grand synthesis of Western philosophy has reached its climax: Leibniz and Schopenhauer
combined in one complete system. Yes, Nietzsche did leave a finished body of thought.
He never wrote the projected Will to Power for the simple reason that his notes for the
work in progress in essence finalized Western metaphysics and prepared the stage for the
post-metaphysical philosophy of Heidegger [122,123].
With Kierkegaard [131–133], the psyche’s interior monologue is brought to the fore
while setting metaphysical introspection against the classical background of the Cartesian
reflective Subject that reached its climax in Hegel’s Logic [213]. Kierkegaard should probably
be compared with Fichte, never with Descartes. Following the remarkable analysis in
Althusser’s The Spectre of Hegel [281], it is now well-known and in general accepted that
Hegel’s philosophy is extremely close to the so-called problems of “existence,” such as fear,
anxiety, emptiness, and so. Sartre’s work Being and Nothing [215] is understood within
this framework. The importance of Althusser’s book, however, is that it codified the depth-
psychological connection in Hegel by showing how the logical categories in the latter were
originally motivated by problems of personal encounter with real life. The conditions of
modernity reached their first disturbing conclusion in the early decades of the nineteenth
century following the French Revolution and the devastation of the General European War
that followed, where we find that, in a certain sense, Hegel [271] represented a specific
philosophical response to the upheavals that the Napoleonic wars brought to Europe by that
time. But in the unique work by Kierkegaard one finds a deeper involvement with the inner
world of Geist that is simultaneously both original and anti-Cartesian in spirit. In a certain
sense, Kierkegaard anticipated both Nietzsche and Heidegger, although the consequences of
this anticipation are yet to be worked out. Now both Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer can be
considered two very different ways to move beyond orthodox Kantianism and the Hegelian
version, an approach to reality that is inspired by introspective investigations but never
reducible to reflection and subjective knowing.
This was the first half of the nineteenth century. In the second half, RichardWagner [277]
and Karl Marx [230, 282] took the lead by introducing into philosophy – probably for the
first time in history41 – the sociological and political dimension of being. They worked
independently of each other, Marx through political economy and Wagner through art,
but they were united in their militant activities against capitalism and the old traditional
Prussian state [285]. Marx inaugurated his philosophical journey by criticizing the Hegelian
system [282] (already dissolving by the late 1830s), while Wagner started totally alone then
later discovered Schopenhauer [285]. Wagner became Nietzsche’s mentor (and intellectual
Godfather) [280], while Marx befriended Engels. This lead to the birth of sociology, cultural
theory, and a new way of viewing history. Most importantly, it gave rise to the twentieth-
century invention of social ontology, a topic essential for understanding postmodernism and
a central objective in event ontology.
41We follow a minority of opinions believing that Hegel’s social ontology, for example as
reconstructed by Marcuse [283] or Lukacs [284], was in fact an overinterpretation of Hegel filtered
through Marx and Marxism. Marx essential thinking is non-Hegelian, e.g., see [21].
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5. Interlude: Social Ontology
Now, what is it this “Sociological Turn” which we attributed its discovery to figures such
as Wagner and Marx? First of all, previous thinkers like Kant [286–288], Herder [289],
Fichte [290–292], and Hegel [293], all saw clearly and explicitly the importance of society in
forming a balanced and well-articulated concept of the individual. Nowhere does one find this
clearer than in Fichte, who wrote extensively on the topic, for example deriving the structure
of the Subject by means of the equilibrium resulting from dialectic exchanges between the
ego and the other, ‘I’ and ‘You’, ‘Us’ and ‘They’, and so on [130, 291]. Hegel even went
further by making the study of history, in particular the history of human civilization [294],
that is, society, his main new contribution beyond Fichte [283,284]. However, in our opinion,
something totally new emerged in the wake of Wagner and Marx that is not easily reducible
to anything Kantian: The social nature of being as such. Wagner’s theoretical writings in
the late 1840s, early 1850s, formulated in a very direct and explicit fashion a primordial
significance of human relations transcending the personal and private sphere of Christianity
and Kantianism. The formulation of this subtle and extremely elusive viewpoint is not
easy to pin down in the vast corpus of Wagner’s prose and verse writings, but it appears
that something very similar to Marx’s ontological assumption has been already working its
effect on Wagner’s mind throughout this period. Wagner was aware of the Hegel movement
in the history of philosophy. Although he does not go into direct polemical attack as in
Marx, his texts suggest that the overall scheme of the (German) idealist stand was in the
main familiar to him. Moreover, he was in fact critical of this very orthodox philosophical
position. The return to the Greeks in Wagner took a shape very different from the other
famous endorsement of the ancient world by Hegel and the Romantics. Wagner did not
advocate a naive return by interpreting the Greek lifeworld based on the modern stand of
human consciousness, but rather, as Nietzsche later will also do, he reformulated Attic tragic
drama in forms and expressions that are essentially postmodern. Since he did not have at
his disposal the Jungian concept of collective unconscious, the only alternative was to first
develop a social understanding of nature and life, and second to rely on myth as a reservoir
of collective knowledge accumulated through the long-term evolutionary advance of human
culture.
The first move, that regarding the social nature of being, is very similar to Marx’s
own conviction. As was also the case in Capital [230], Wagner did not write a full
philosophical account in detailed fashion, but hints and remarks about the inter-subjective
force of social interactions can be found everywhere in his writings. To be more specific,
Wagner postulated that the effective approach toward the mastery of the inner world of
the human psyche/soul/Geist, enacted in a manner that resists the bourgeois tendency to
overemphasize the private ego, is to acknowledge the social character of our values, beliefs,
inner emotional states. Politics shapes Reason, not the other way around as was claimed by
the Enlightenment. The social field of existing culture affects our habits, even the biologically-
based ones like eating, drinking, copulation. The ideal universal Mind or Pure Reason found
in modern philosophy and reaching its summit in the classic thinkers of the eighteenth century
is here rejected by both Wagner and Marx. Instead of Universal Reason, there is random
and fluctuating field of forces existing in society and modifying and shaping the behaviour of
the individuals living within close range from each other. Yet true, neither Marx nor Wagner
did provide any serious attempt to explicate the laws of these social phenomena (this had to
wait till Tarde [295], Simmel [232], and Weber [296]), but the basic idea, that politics comes
before being, can be already found there. It is precisely in this sense that Marx should be
considered a true revolutionary in the history of philosophy. Before his work people tended
to overlook the social dimension of the process of thinking, highlighting, instead, the typical
image of the abstract thinker contemplating reality from behind closed doors and in isolation
from the Real. Wagner for instance would expand this formulation by building all his opera
dramas on a concrete and actual ground. In the Ring Cycle, just to give one example, the
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entire history of capitalism and industrialism is encapsulated within the boundary domains of
the carefully crafted realm of myth and fantasy [285,297,298]. Even in other dramas where a
critique of capitalism is not prominent, Wagner always had in mind some well-defined social
context of interaction, say the erotic, where the philosophical content of the music and verse
unfolds the radically new and original understanding of the social nature of being.
Regarding the second move by Wagner, the utilization of myth, this can be compared
to Marx’s occupation with political economy. The social ontologies of Marx and Wagner
may appear at first glance totally disconnected from each other though this is only illusory.
Wagner used myth exactly like what Marx had done in his voluminous economic writings,
that is, as a medium of explanation of what seems to be basically one idea: Social relations
create the individual and direct the flow of thinking and even envelope private speculations
and inner thoughts.
What myth and economy share in common is both being trans-subjective total structures
with no localizable centers to be found in the individual psyches belonging to well-defined
social groups. Capitalism as such is not to be located inside the capitalist’s psyche, and myth-
making is not the personalized literary creative power of priests and shamans. Capitalism
and myth predate the unique individual and surpass him. Mythical narratives and capital are
objective formations, say products forged by the Will (Schopenhauer, Wagner, Nietzsche),
the collective unconscious (Jung), desire (Spinoza, Deleuze, and Guattari), power relations
(Foucault), or relations of production (Marxism). But this kind of “objectivity” is not defined
with respect to a corresponding “subjectivity” as in Kant and Hegel. Otherwise, we fall back
on either a private subject creating the world (Berkeley) or a universal Subject (the Absolute
in Schelling and Hegel), both being extreme variants of idealism. Economy and myth can
function as “objectivity-without-subject” if the social nature of being is brought to the fore as
an essential ontological clue for the understanding of the genesis of culture and life. Indeed,
it is the social field that creates objective formations, capitalist field of power relations or the
priestly shamanism of symbolic and ritualistic relations. The infrastructure of both processes,
economy and myth, is semiotic in character.
But neither Marx nor Wagner were fully aware of the ontological concept of the
social field, which had to wait for more than a century before receiving its first embryonic
formulation in Althusser, Deleuze, and Foucault (Heidegger, as usual, anticipated the whole
storey much earlier, but we cannot examine this in details here.) The absence of such field
theory led the Marxists immediately following Marx’s death to a return to Hegel, or idealism,
in order to develop the canonical infra-/super-structure dichotomy (Lenin in the East [299],
Luckacs in the West [284]), in effect copying the Cartesian dualism in an inverted form:
Materialism −→ Inverted Idealism −→ Idealism (1)
One of the main objectives of event ontology is to counteract this inversion by developing
a non-Marxist, non-dialectical version of materialism. To accomplish this, social ontology
must be treated as a branch of the philosophy of nature, i.e., not as a part of the “human
sciences” and hence not falling within the science and philosophy of nature. Against the
latter separation between “nature” and “the human,” event ontology endorses a version of
cosmic monism by which all nature, including human or nonhuman societies, can be treated
on equal footing. This radical viewpoint requires then a careful reexamination of the very
concept of the social per se.
The discovery of the social nature of being introduced into philosophy the most
important development of the initial criticism of idealism found in Schopenhauer’s main
work. Society is understood in terms of collective wholes comprised of individuals. Relations
ensue among those individuals taking the form of social interactions. The important thing
to observe here is how this modern grasp of society fundamentally involves a version of
“atomism,” or at least “corpuscularism,” together with the immediate classical problem of
how to relate those little parts to the encompassing whole. Schopenhauer’s metaphysics
lacks this “atomic understanding of being,” although it was developed previously by Leibniz
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in his monadology and other texts [10, 300]; this is why, generally speaking, we tend to
find the original metaphysical concept of Will somehow vague, and even at times mystical
(compare also with Bergson’s elan vital [1].) This might be explained by the strong affinity
that Schopenhauer felt toward Plato and Kant, who in the main favored the Universal
and the Complete against the Singular and the Open. In any case, Marx and Wagner
provided us with a first “repair” of the postmodernist inception point found in Schopenhauer.
Nietzsche will soon supply a more refined formulation in the working notes of the Will to
Power [231,274,301]. The first synthesis of Nietzsche and Marx is the work of Georg Simmel,
one of the founders of modern sociology [232,302–304]. Gabriel Tarde, another pioneer of the
same field, will also construct an atomic theory of society based on imitation as a fundamental
form of interaction between individuals [295].
Finally, though Russell did not create a fully-fledged social ontology, his mathematical
philosophy of events, especially the manner it was used in The Analysis of Matter [3] and
Human Knowledge [4], presents one of most profound “atomic ontologies” ever created in
Western thinking. The Event will become the cornerstone of the missing social ontology yet
to be constructed by event philosophy. Fields, social fields and ideological fields and many
others, are defined and articulated in terms of events, not subjects or objects. Both the
Subject and his subordinated objects emerge only later as secondary or derivative solutions
of problems posed in a pre-individual world consisting of events and events alone [6, 7]. The
social field is a virtual field of forces acting on events, and through a context of interaction
between various events, some of them will separate and “condensate” into a Subject, while
others – still connected all together – will form the “objects” subordinated (symbiotically,
semiotically) to the Subject. In other terms, the social field precedes the formation of
the individual. Individuals are defined and created by non-personal relations of power
that out-exist the total sum of persons taken together. This is how sociology becomes
ontology: Instead of thinking in terms of fully-formed subjects later entering into social
interactions among each other, we start with a social relation that exists even without relata
(Russell [39, 226, 305, 306], Simondon [6, 7]), a relation that subsists in absence of human
or individual factors entering into it. Relations in fact – these abstract schema of power –
are the very reason why Subjects can come into being in the later phase characterising the
emergence of ego-consciousness with its certificatory subjecthood. Relations in the form of
social and ideological fields are the formative power in society and life, the morphogenetic
field of the ontogenesis of culture and matter.
6. On the Event
6.1. A historical preparation
What are events? One may best start by historically examining how the new concept was
created in reaction to old problems in the Western philosophical tradition. But what is the
Western tradition? We define this intellectual domain to start with the death of Aristotle
in 322 BC. Everything before and including Aristotle is considered Greek philosophy proper.
Therefore, starting with the early pre-Socratic sages and philosophers [307], one does not
find a continuous long history called “Western thinking,” but rather two distinct traditions,
the Greek and the Western. Between the two there exists both rupture and continuity.
Continuity because the major instrument of research, the Greek language, was the same,
though it was gradually “upgraded” to Latin [308], then the modern vernaculars of German,
French, Italian, English, and others [270]. And there is a historical rupture because following
Aristotle’s death, philosophy directed itself – first slowly, then almost exclusively – toward
the problem of subjectivity and the individual.
We say “almost” because there existed that extraordinary brief movement that employed
the Arabic language to reinvent philosophy again starting from Aristotle [309]. The major
stars are Avicenna [241, 268], Averroes [242–244, 310, 311], and Ibn Khaldon [312], the
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three being very well-known figures but rarely read. In contrast to the Western tradition
(Hellenstic, Roman, and European), the Arabic philosophers did not react to Stoicism,
Cynicism, and Epicurism, but focused most of their energy on the Aristotelian writings.
In fact, they did not pay much attention to Plato and the Academy, although Neoplatonism
was taken seriously but through its Aristotelian prism (Plotinus) as in Avicenna’s system for
example [241]. We still don’t possess any complete understanding of the Arabic-language
philosophers (most of them were not even ethnically Arabs [267]), and the topic is further
complicated by the difficulties of editing and reading their entire range of reflections and
teachings (much of it lost, some preserved in Hebrew or Latin translations.) Given that
there has never existed an environment well conductive to philosophical research in the
contemporary “Arabic-speaking world” itself, the classic “Arab philosophers” remain as
enigmatic and poorly understood in the present-day Middle East as they have ever been
in the West. In this work, we will not develop any fundamental reconsideration of this now
forgotten philosophical tradition, even though (we hope) this will probably happen sometime
in the future.
Coming back now to the Graeco-Western tradition, event philosophy can be viewed as
the first major attempt to revitalize Greek philosophy in reaction to the dominant Western
philosophy centered on the Subject. For this reason, both conceptually and chronologically,
it is not possible to grasp the significance of what an event refers to without at the same time
fully understanding the historico-cultural context of Idealism.
But Idealism has been continuously evolving in a very complex fashion since Aristotle’s
death, going through Epicurism, Stoicism, Cynicism, Skepticism, Neoplatonism, Christianity,
and then modernism (Kantianism.) We certainly don’t imply that the roots of Idealism can
be found in, for example, Stoicism, to which event ontology owes much (Whitehead [313],
Deleuze [31].) The discourse of subjectivity first began to take shape in the thinking of the
Stoics and Epicurean, but without having in full form the modern Cartesian Subject [79]
or the Freudian Ego [314, 315], which were unknown to Antiquity. However, as Heidegger
[41, 119, 120, 122, 123, 203] and Foucault [316–320] had convincingly demonstrated in their
respective groundbreaking studies of Western intellectual history, the “Modern Subject”42
is unthinkable without the long and laborious preparation made available by the post-
Aristotelian Greek and Roman philosophers [99, 102, 103, 211, 321], including Christianity
[105,111].
In agreement with both Heidegger and Foucault, we find that the presence of Aristotle
in history is a unique singularity in the complex chain of historical philosophical development
started by Hesiod, Thales, and the first philosophers: Everything that is typically Greek and
Western is exactly that which is not Aristotle! Indeed, while reading the commentaries of
a “pre-Modern” philosopher like Averroes [242–244], one sometimes gets the uncanny feeling
that in Aristotle there had already been a fully-fledged event ontology similar to Leibniz and
Russell, Whitehead and Deleuze. The similarity should not be very surprising given the fact
that Leibniz, the first creator of event ontology, was among the minority of philosophers in
the Western tradition who did read Aristotle (probably Heidegger and Averroes remain the
greatest readers of Aristotle up to date.) However, it will be difficult to travel into event
ontology through Aristotle, at least we cannot do so in a direct fashion. Our hope is that in
future research it will be possible to reconstruct an “event-ontology version” of Aristotelian
thinking, but only gradually, while working from the most recent formulations back to the
chronologically correct inception point of the actual Aristotle.
6.2. The Logical Construction of the Event
A negative definition of the event would construe it as something like “counter-Subject” or
“non-perception.” Therefore, the event may be viewed as that which is not. In fact, this is a
return to an extreme version of Idealism that is still popular even today: Hegelianism. But the
42Regardless to what exactly we do agree on understanding these days by this term.
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Nothing is not irrelevant to being, and no true beginning in philosophy can kick off without
an encounter with the notorious operator of negation.43 Let us then start by examining the
event as a negative being in contrast to subjectivity. With the risk of oversimplifying, the
event can be provisionally viewed as an “anti-subject.”
If subjecthood is all about the Cartesian Subject, then logic and categories come into
the picture as the required apparatus needed to establish the Subject. This is because a
Subject in the classical sense of Idealism is intimately connected with universality and the
Universal. From this universalism, Idealism proceed to derive
(i) the modern concepts of essence (Kant [84], Hegel [213]) in metaphysics;
(ii) the mathematical ideas of invariance [179], global [325], at-the-large [164];
(iii) and the laws of nature in physics, chemistry, biology (Descartes [202], Kant [143],
Hegel [326], Husserl [15].)
As a first approximation, a negation of the Universal would involve the opposite (yet classical)
concept of the Particular. So a clever – but by no means correct – solution will be to
posit a scenario of “dynamic equilibrium” between the two opposing poles, the Universal and
Particular.
Hegel did exactly this, no doubt inspired – like all other Idealists – by the geometrical
metaphor of the big Circle: The celebrated return of the Self to the Self. In the larger
Logic [213], there is a perpetual movement, the now canonical “dialectic flux of experience,”
continuously taking place between the immediate and the mediated, the concrete and the
concept (universal), the Subject and Object, and so on. Though very meticulous technical
distinctions between all these pairs can be found in the torturous system of Hegelian ontology,
the basic idea is always the same, that discussed earlier in connection to Kant’s theory of
essence as the dynamics of appearing/reappearing, where it is found that something illusory
is generated by movement such that while there is nothing but pure relations (no subject-in-
itself, no object-in-itself, but only relations between Subject and Object) in constant whirl
and flow, a fixed essence is nevertheless generated from this immanent dynamics: Being as
the residue remaining after exhausting all illusory movements.
This is why any philosophy of the event that goes through Hegelianism, for example
Sartre [215], Marcuse [258, 283], Adorno [116, 117], Merleau-Ponty [327], Badiou [328], will
eventually collapse back into Idealism. The reason for this curious trap is that this entire
business of the dialectic in Hegel logically presupposes a “thinking substrate” very different
from the postmodern concept of thinking to be found in Heidegger [210], Jung [193,248], and
Foucault [245]. The Hegelian form of thinking was originally proclaimed by the Master to
be non-subjective but, in fact, by examining the actual technical detailed implementation of
Hegel’s philosophy, the entire structure of the return-to-the-self is based on a personalistic
conception, hence ultimately grounded in subjectivity [21,124].
Our use of the term ‘logic’ above is not accidental, for the signature of a personalistic
Subject is the existence of an elaborate apparatus of normative rules, mainly logic and axioms.
On the other hand, non-personalistic endeavors to understand thinking such as those found
in Bergson, Heidegger, Simondon, Jung, Deleuze, and Foucault, impute a quasi-“objective”
value to the existence of a productive force “exterior” (ontologically prior) to the individual
but shaping and creating a fully-formed Subject only later ; that is, the subject would emerge
as the outcome of an ontogenetic process [6, 7, 43]. During this process, there are no logical
rules, no axioms, no Subject and Object in constant dialectic dance with each other, no
ontological illusion (for otherwise, to whom this illusion would appear?), no self and other,
and no big metaphysical “Return” to anything whatsoever.
43See for example Heidegger’s famous lecture What is Metaphysics? [128]. The relation between
Heidegger and Hegel is complex and obscure [121, 124, 322–324]. It is not very well understood even
today. Though Heidegger always maintained a great personal respect for Hegel, he rarely quotes him
approvingly.
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6.3. The Ontological Approach to Events: Post-Hegelian Thinking in Russell and
Heidegger
From the above, we conclude that in order to protect the concept of the event from any
potential contamination with Idealism – whether Kantianism or Hegelianism, phenomenology
or modern mathematics – one must abstain at any cost from flirting with the apparatus
of negation, especially negative dialectic. Obviously, the most immediate difficulty facing
us in doing so is the consequent need to abandon dualistic thinking. This may explain
why dialectic, since Socrates and Plato and through Hegel up to Marxism and present-day
academic “philosophy,” has been a very popular favourite in Western philosophy, both the
continental and Anglo-American traditions included. Mankind is just enamoured with pairs,
couples, and doubles. It is not a Pythagorean-style number mysticism, in this case the number
‘two’, but rather the two-fold-ness-in-itself what allures the philosopher into thinking the
double as such. By becoming two, the given can be dominated and apprehended. Compare
with the division of the One into Two, as we find in the conception of the solitary in Nietzsche’s
thought [329]. How do we come to associate every single object with another? Logic provides
the easiest clue: Negation. Affixing an operator ‘Not’ before the name of the given object
will generate, by nothing but the power of personal thought itself, another different object,
the negated one. The very model of logical negation might be traced back to the earliest form
of language. The technology of writing itself, whether idiographic or alphabetical, supplied
probably the first implementation of negation; it is easy to distinguish between any given
object, represented by its written name, and the negation of the object, represented in turn
by adjoining a mark to the original name: A becomes Not-A, and so on. Even the infamous
suspension of the law of the excluded middle in Intuitionism [330] does not supply a genuine
advance beyond that dualistic thinking so characteristic of Idealism.
Instead, there is an urgent need to look at the problem of nature (society, creation,
thought and aesthetics) from a new angle that transcends the very concept of ‘law’ or ‘rule’
as such. Events, being supra-logical, trans-subjective, do not follow normative rules or formal
axioms such as those employed by mathematics and Idealism. The unfolding of events
is immanent and, strictly speaking, self-moving or autogenetic without needing dualistic
thinking. This is the fundamental problem that faces postmodernism: How to construct
pure immanence free of dualism? [331]. Fichte, who supplied the first post-Kantian critique
that can be considered genuinely postmodern, developed the mechanism of the virtual/actual
(determinable/determinate) as an ontological foundation upon which the classical concepts
of Ego and Other, Subject and Object, with their conventional dualistic tinge, can be
erected [197]. Later, Bergson [1, 250, 251], Simondon [6, 7], and Deleuze [31, 43] would also
invoke the virtual/actual ontology in the critique of Idealism, each in his own way.
The reason why Fichte is not usually acknowledged in such fundamental critical examina-
tion is the widely-held misconstrual of his project in the secondary literature as Idealistic and
dualistic in and through. Indeed, the mechanism of the determinable/determinate developed
in the very unique Fichtean text [197] has been treated by commentators as a fully-fledged
duality isomorphic to other dualities, for example the Subject/Object or Ego/Other. To
be sure, some of Fichte’s other “canonical” writings, e.g., see [130], encourage such – in our
opinion inaccurate – interpretation of his entire project. Nevertheless, careful reading of how
the ‘determinable’ is constructed and used in his more technical text [197] reveals something
totally different.
Indeed, and independently of Fichte, Heidegger would develop the subject in Being and
Time [18], where the determinable is seen there as more akin to Being when the latter is
understood in the manner of an open virtual field of “potentials” or “potentialities” (not logical
possibilities) that may be actualized in various modes. The big project of Being and Time
is to provide an inventory of those manifold modalities along which the univocal “stuff and
flesh” of Being materializes into “objectified” beings, i.e., actualized things and concretized
individuals. There is always a univocal “background,” for example Being (Heidegger [18]),
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the infinite anonymous murmur (Foucault [245, 332]), the determinable (Fichte [197]). This
background acts like an ontological horizon against which the movement of actualization is
enacted. The notorious Heideggerian theory of truth as “clearing” is a colorful depiction – in
words – of a naturalistic process that, strictly speaking, is meta-linguistic and fundamentally
non-representable. The movement of creation/production in nature is that which marks
out “something” as determinate by bringing forth its presence out of the determinable as
such. But Heidegger went farther when he bracketed out even this “something.” In some
of the esoteric manuscripts of the late 1930s [30], Heidegger would develop the most radical
post-metaphysical critique he had ever written by deriving this “something” from the pure
relational structure of movement in Clearing (Truth of Being, Aletheia, etc). Let us never
forget that one of the major goals of Being and Time was to destroy dualistic thinking by
creating a new language, that of fundamental ontology as presented in Division I (usually
mislabeled as “phenomenological research”), a language that understands movement and
dynamics in a way closer to Aristotle’s Physics [333] than Husserl’s phenomenology [90]
or Kant’s transcendental philosophy [84].
But instead of having to operate with two concepts in dialectical relation with each other,
namely the virtual and the actual, or Being and beings, there is now the entire apparatus of
the famous ontological difference in which there is a fundamental asymmetry between Being
and beings. Russell, in The Principles of Mathematics [226], had a correct instinctive grasp
of the problem when he reduced being to a pure field of asymmetric relations. Although
we don’t know if Heidegger did read Russell’s book, the project of Being and Time overlaps
significantly with Russell’s, appearances pointing to the contrary. What matters here is that
the anti-Hegelian Russell [70], mistrustful of all kinds of dualistic thinking, originally went
into mathematical philosophy in order to construct an efficient formal language that may
satisfy some of the major requirements and goals that would be spelled out by Heidegger a
quarter of century later.
In the Heidegger Universe, the total matrix of Being, the virtual field, is a sort of global
source emanating beings through movement (flow.) The pure relational structure at stake
here [40], the very mutual “push-and-pull” between the background (ontological horizon) and
the emerging beings – the dynamics of Clearing in Aletheia [41] – is the ultimate form of the
event [30]. The event is then flow per se, where dynamics is “taking place precisely nowhere”;
the flow is differentiated only by reference to its relational topological inner composition. As
we will show somewhere else, “space” itself is derived from events [13, 306]. Events do not
occur “in” space. In fact, there is space only because there have been events. This, in other
words, is the Russellian stand in The Principles of Mathematics [226] stating that the verb
comes ontologically before the name, which also influenced Deleuze in his Logic of Sense [31].
Traditionally, events are linked to a series of special concepts such as occasions, verbs,
actions, singularities, happenings. Throughout the history of ideas, philosophers had grappled
with the enormous technical difficulties encountered whenever there had been a desire to tame
and dominate the event within a rigorous scheme based on the Idealist heritage of categories.
In the classical ontology founded on logic, the concept of universality is contrasted with the
particular in a way that forces the event to become problematic: Every treatment of the
latter brings tension to the whole system. This was realized very early in the attempts to
integrate the Aristotelian concept of accident into the already vague and open framework of
substance. Substantial being versus accidental being, or the universal against the event. But
certainly the full complex range of meanings associated with the term ‘accident’ overflows the
more specific understanding of ‘event’ we have in postmodernism. Accidental being includes
events, but not the other way around. At the same time, the event is not an examples of a
particular being. The most subtle issue involved in event ontology is the distinction between
the event and the particular when the latter is defined as the “non-universal.” In other words,
the event is not a negation of the universal. This is the case not because events and universals
are in harmony with each other (for they are not), but rather for the more basic reason that
the entire theoretical categorical framework distinctive of Idealism – the logic of universals –
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is being brought under critical examination here.
One of the greatest merits of Russell and Heidegger is that in their quest to overturn
Idealism they have tried to construct a new language transcending classical logic and purely
axiomatic mathematics. Initially, Russell first contributeed to classical logic by giving it its
most rigorous and complete form, modern mathematical logic. However, his anti-classical or
postmodern critique was not sufficiently emphasized by him, relegated instead to scattered
paragraphs embedded within apparently classical chapters and books. Similarly with
Heidegger, his new language, that of Being and Time, presented a post-topological approach
to the world that surpassed the classic structure of modern mathematics [334]. Albert
Lautman [187] was among the very few who observed the depth of Heidegger’s engagement
with mathematics, but generally speaking a field like “Heideggerian mathematics” remains
hidden from the overall view and needs to be developed more systematically. Whether the
claimed postmodern Heideggerian mathematics can be adequately taken up in event ontology
or not is a question we leave open for the time being. The ambitious scope of Being and Time
might have contributed to damaging the positive progress that Heidegger achieved with his
postmodern Aristotelian-style mathematics since it is quite difficult to concentrate on physics
while the evolving structure of the book is fast moving toward the human lifeworld and its
nonpersonal ontological matrix, Dasien. It is more probable that the pre-Dasien chapters
and sections have more to say about the physical world than what has been believed so far,
but certainly the disproportionate division of the exposition between Dasien and non-Dasien
within the totality of Being, which is another reflection of the incompleteness of the work as
a whole, makes a final decision regarding the role of mathematical philosophy in the early
Heidegger notoriously difficult.
7. The Postmodernist Turn
7.1. Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari
The most important post-Heidegger thinkers are Althusser, Deleuze, Foucault, and Guattari
(the French Quartet?) In their literary output they had collectively invented a “post-
classical prose style” suitable for and relevant to the emerging event ontology, an integral
component of postmodernism. Louis Althusser had mapped out the general structure of the
new language, referring to it as “the missing philosophical method that Marx never found the
time to develop” [21, 23, 24, 108, 109, 149, 299, 335–337]. Early in his career, in the Nietzsche
book [338], and no doubt indirectly inspired by Althusser the postmodernist par excellence,
Deleuze developed an original philosophy of nature based on the Nietzschean Will to Power ’s
rhizomatic apparatus of forces and power relations working outside the subject [231,301]; in
a certain way, the aim is surpassing previous orthodox models practiced in psychoanalysis
and conventional idealist philosophy [90,134,314,315] by directly confronting the problem of
subjectivity at the level of the Simondonian ontogenesis of psychic being [6, 7].
Foucault was influenced by the early 1960s Deleuzean interpretation and appropriation
of Nietzsche [332], but he developed in the mid 1960s a different style of critique that was
relatively further removed from physical nature than Deleuze’s, while closer to the human
lifeworld of historical experience [245,252]. For instance, the discovery of the bifurcation of the
world into statements and visibilities parallels the dynamics of Heideggerian Clearing [18,219],
the Virtual/Actual (Simondon [6, 7], Deleuze [43]), and the Determinable/Determinate
(Fichte [197]). Foucault never fell into the trap of dualistic thinking as did his illustrious
modernist French contemporaries Levi-Strauss [339, 340], Sartre [215], and Marleu-Ponty
[216, 217]. The new archaeology of knowledge does not divide cultural contents into two
categories, statements and visibilities [252], but rather engages in a deep and profound
dialogue with the genetic process in which the actual objects of history, the visibles, are
generated from the overall background of what Deleuze called the ‘anonymous murmur’ of
sayings and statements existing before and exterior to fully-formed individuals and subjects
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[332,341].
Finally, the extraordinary career of Felix Guattari opened the doors wide open to all
previous currents of thought so they can happily mix, mingle, and interact with each other,
producing at the end a grand synthesis of the three previous French thinkers but also pushing
forward in a way that still has not been exhausted up to date [112, 189–191, 276, 342–346].
With Guattari, the new philosophical language is event ontology at its most direct and
explicit form. The formal language [276] is borrowed from Pierce [275], not Russell [226].
The literary style of the presentation is that of Deleuze. The scope is post-Foucauldean. In
Guattari, the Subject is produced by nonpersonal forces, and the task of the philosopher is
to understand this process in two ways:
(i) The productivity of a subject within a dominant capitalist order.
(ii) The very general process of subjectivation and how it can be exploited, for example via
art, to resist capitalism and previous forms of the production of the subjectivity.
Here and eslewhere, the technical terms subjectivation, subjectivization, subjectification, and
closely related derivatives, are treated as technical ontological expressions. Such terminologies
are most commonly used and discussed in the secondary literature of postmodernism
[347–349], especially the literature based on Foucault and Guattari.44 In future places
(but not here), when the detailed relation between event ontology and subjectivity is
examined in full, we will have more to say about the subtle differences in meaning between
various terms and expressions involved with the processes of the production of subjectivity.
For our immediate purposes in this article, few additional insights are included below for
completeness.
7.2. Being and Subjectivity
The “enigma of the subject” is the riddle of Western thought, classical and modern alike.
Al solutions produced up to Nietzsche have culminated in erecting the Subject instead of
subject. This is not a subjectivization process, at least not in the sense understood by the
French Quartet. The long and complex process through which the Subject is ontologically
produced necessarily involves the full spectrum of two levels:
(i) Molecular subjects (microscopic structure).
(ii) The dominating fields operating on them (macroscopic structure or the molar sphere.)
Since the beginning of civilization, “little selves” (micro-subjects) have been created and
annihilated by the perpetual flux of becoming in society [25, 190]. The main line here is the
erosion of individuality exactly at the moment an Ego is installed right at the center of the
person. Although Deleuze and Guattari had suggested that it seems there are fundamental
differences between Primitive, Despotic, and Capitalistic regimes of social organization [25],
to us there might be some exaggeration in the way such three “cultural epochs” are postulated
in social ontology. Indeed, the dissolution of the self began as early as language and
is contemporaneous with the event of language as such. Speaking and pointing already
presuppose a highly differentiated and advanced sociopolitical order that had already initiated
a preliminary form of exploitation and oppression directed at those to whom one speaks in
communication systems. The ‘violence of the word’ is not only a metaphorical pun, but the
authentic expression of a fundamental truth: language is infused with politics right from its
inception moment. Idealism then has been in existence thousands of years before Descartes.
The signature of the Idealistic worldview is the presence of produced subjects dominated by
a universal Subject, for example the Shaman, the King, God, the Market, it does not matter
which one as long as the ontogrammatical form of domination is that of the subject/object
dichotomy. The Kantian recasting of Idealism in terms of being-in-itself and phenomena does
44This literature has grown enormously in recent years and we don’t even attempt to be
representative with the literature review. However, see some works on subjectivity such as [348–350].
42
not change the picture since the phenomenal as such, which is the main element of the world
in Kantianism, is absolutely founded on the transcendental subject, the Subject.
Even Hegel’s infamous alleged rejection of the subjective [213] and his open self-professed
interest in nature [326] had consistently failed to completely break away from Descartes
and Kant (in spite of the profundity of the Hegelian criticism of Idealism found in many
of his admirable texts such as [271].) The truth is that the Absolute in Hegel’s ontology,
particularly the ritualistic “return to the self,” is based on an explicit ontologization of Fichte’s
phenomenology [130], the latter being, in essence, a philosophical psychology. Therefore, the
subject did resurface again in the Absolute Subject of Hegel’s metaphysics and we are sent
back to Idealism [124].
It is only with Heidegger and Russell that one of the roots of the problem was identified:
the bifurcation of the world into subjects and objects. With those two philosophers, the use
of traditional terminology appears to have been dealt with either with extreme care (Russell)
or open mistrust (Heidegger.) Russell did invent his version of event ontology for precisely
the reason of avoiding the formal apparatus of Idealism. Heidegger’s Being and Time [18]
was the alternative formal approach to nature that bypassed the standpoint of Idealism from
the very beginning. In the field of psychology proper, Jung did what Heidegger and Russell
achieved in philosophy and Marx in sociology: He founded a new science that – for the first
time since Aristotle and Leibniz – does not presuppose the Subject as the center of orientation
of the whole discipline.
7.3. The Process of Subjectification in Nature
We will speak of subjectification as a generic term associated with every ontological process
that has to do with subjecthood. In contrast to ‘subjectification’, we also employ the more
special key concept of subjectivization, which has become popular in the wake of Foucault’s
famous so-called “ethical turn” starting from 1980 till his death in 1984. The origin of
subjectivization, however, could be possibly attributed to Guattari, in particular within the
context of his collaboration with Deleuze in writing A Thousand Plateaus [8]. It is possible
to conjecture that Foucault was one of the very few people around 1980 who were acutely
aware of the impact that the revolutionary ideas of Guattari were beginning to make through
the powerful literary form that Deleuze’s writing style had given them during the 1970s.
A Thousand Plateaus contained – among other things – the most detailed examination of
the production of Subject found in the European literature since Heidegger’s Being and
Time [18]. All mechanisms of subjectification were examined afresh within the perspective of
the new ontology of multiplicity that was being also developed in the same labyrinthine book.
Those mechanisms gave birth to what we now understand by the term ‘subjectivization’.
For example, the concepts facility, segmentarity, capture, striation, are all fundamental
ontological correlates to material mechanisms underlying the processes of the production
of both subjects and Subjects in nature. Moreover, not only that this Deleuzeo-Guattarian
formulation would overlap with the erection of the Subject, the Despotic Signifier, but also –
and here comes the originality of the shamefully underrated post-Deleuze Guattari – it does
not exhaust subjectivity as such.45
In my opinion, Foucault’s famous turn toward questions of subjectivity by choosing
the framework of ethics has more to do with Guattari than with Deleuze-and-Guattari. It
is the peculiar dimension of the problematic, the elusive, almost imperceptible wavering
line between Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault what we think is best captured by the subtle
distinction between subjectification and subjectivization. The former is more classical, and
45By reading Guattari’s solo writings, it is becoming increasingly clearer that his understanding of
subjectivity is somehow not identical with the one found in the books signed by Deleuze or by both
of them together. That does not imply that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s concepts of the subject are
contradictory, but only that Guattari might have been pushing further beyond what Deleuze actually
managed to write down in the published versions of their philosophy.
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asks about what does it take to make a subject in general. The latter is more specific: It
concerns not only the communal environment of the subject, especially that linked to the
Subject as a Despotic Signifier, but rather inquires into the modes of existence of marginal
selves created right in the middle of the action of society at large, the paradoxical production
of marginalized but “central average”: The everyman of modern mass consumerist culture,
the average Roman citizen in the Empire, the pious peasant in Catholic Europe, the typical
mathematician in mainstream universities, and so on. They all have something in common:
The subject is not a Subject, it is not the black hole of Guattari and Deleuze [8], but rather
the subject as subject-captured by-the-Subject, the subject playing the role of that structure
essentially complementary to the Despotic Signifier.
It is for exactly these reasons that Guattari was able to foresee in this type of
“marginalized” or plebeian subjectivity the means for establishing an ontology of post-Marxist
political resistance. The war with capitalism does not go through a direct challenge of
the existing world order, for example a Soviet-style or Maoist revolution, but rather via a
method not much different from the one developed by the Roman Stoics during the first and
second centuries of the Empire: by reinventing the self, by dominating the inner subject
through the integration of selfhood with nature and the others, a process that involves
arts and mathematics orchestrated by a philosophical master thought (the Guide with
the Pythagoreans and Epicureans, the teacher with the Stoics and Cynics, the priest with
Christianity, and so on.)
Subjectivization, then, addresses itself to the total flux of forces forming and creating
the self from the outside in contrast to the classical approach that generates the I-hood of
the person through a play on infinity and finitude as revealed in the endless series of self-
reflections between the Ego and the Other. The genetic method is retained, to be sure, but
completely changed beyond recognition: Indeed, the postmodernist turn of Guattari and
Foucault rejects the dialectical phenomenological Hegelian model and works instead in a way
closer to the philosophy of nature found in Aristotle and the Stoics.
Although the traditional role of the Despot is taken over in the more sophisticated theory
of the Despotic Signifier, a more complex (and maybe eventually more fundamental) process
runs in parallel, that which forms boundaries for empty vessels called the typical individuals
of society, the marginalized subject, and those less frequent techniques in which a positive
and refined subject is created via pedagogy. Therefore, subjectivization involves a double
act: The production of the Everyman, and simultaneously the preparation for the Overman;
the former is the statistically dominating type, while the later is the philosopher-king, the
artist, and the underground mathematician-naturalist of the future. On the other hand, the
normal process of subjectification leading to the production of the Subject (the Universal,
the Despotic Signifier, the Black Hole, etc) is what we will name subjection. Subjectivization
is always accompanied by subjection, for in order to have capture there must be a black hole,
and no black hole is conceivable without at the same time the potentiality of capture arising
for any subject hopping into its horizon.
But that does not imply that the relation between the two ontological processes
of subjectification is dialectic; there is no dual opposition between subjectivization and
subjection. In fact, the very existence of the possibility of politics of resistance in Guattari
strongly suggests that subjectivization is in a certain way an autonomous process that
is “relatively independent” of subjection although the former depends on the environment
created by the latter.
For example, the monastic technique relies on an implicit separation between what the
individual participating in the spiritual exercise considers his own “inner world” on one hand,
and the real, harsh external order of things lying outside his intimate self, on the other hand.
By suspending the presence of the immoral regime outside the monastery’s walls, those who
withdraw into asceticism presuppose that by embarking on this meticulous reinvention of the
self they are about to start, the actual world, the world of the future, will eventually bend to
meet their worldview. Both Stoics and early Christians worked this way, and they certainly
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succeeded in doing so. Now what is important for us in this example is the way in which
the culture of the self (Foucault’s infamous “ethical turn” [318, 319]) represents a form of
subjectivity very different from the classical scenario studied in great depth by Deleuze and
Guattari, that is, the ontological process we called subjection. The former is subjectivization,
and with the Stoics, early Christians, Nietzsche, it is an organized and systematic pedagogy
of the self aiming at preparing the way for a higher human type who is destined to rule the
future, the overman.
There is then a great tension between the classical criticism of postmodernism attacking
and rejecting the Subject as a philosophical category, and the undercurrent movement of
subjectivization that has been working in full power for thousands of years. The contrast
between the two can be described by the strange conflict between the vehement critique of
the Cartesian Subject found in Nietzsche’s late writings and the his parallel, almost exclusive
interest in the human lifeworld and culture, especially art. Moreover, Nietzsche had been
occupied throughout his entire career with the “education of the self,” making himself a
better, higher human being, a philosopher in the manner of the Greeks and Roman Stoics
who is also a good man, not just an intellectual.
In this sense, subjectivization is an onto-political process that aspires to produce new
forms of subjectivity in opposition to those produced by subjection. The subjectivized
subject stands against the subjection’s Subject. This is not a war between two subjects or
two Subjects, but a revolutionary encounter between entirely different forms of subjectivity.
Although Foucault never developed a theory of the politics of resistance like Guattari, this
may have more to do with his early death than his actual frame of mind. It seems that
Foucault’s project of the ‘hermeneutics of the subject’ was essentially a move toward an
endorsement of the ancient polis, at least the spiritual orientation that guided the Roman
Stoics during the High Empire. The failure of commentators and critics to realize the
fundamental divide between the Subject produced by subjection and the subjectivity formed
by subjectivization explains the continuing puzzlement over the celebrated “ethical turn” of
Foucault, the archenemy of the Cartesian-phenomenological Subject.
Guattari’s [189–191,342–344,346] and Foucault’s [318–320,351] theories of subjectiviza-
tion operate with new ontological parameters of the problem of I in general that, we think,
have not been fully understood, even by the minority who reacted positively to the ontology
of A Thousand Plateaus [8]. For how can we differentiate between two types of subjects,
one, the Subject, is classical yet non-transcendental or anti-Kantian, while the other, the
subjectivity leading to the transcendence of overman, is completely outside the standard
subject/object problematic? The second type, the subject, is closer to the Senecan Self, or
the Stoic subject of ancient thought [99]. An initiation of a theory of such formation was
attempted by Foucault in the last phase of his career [318,319], but the ontological scaffolding
of the developmental process, at least in line of the already available provisional but highly
original outline sketched by Jung [248, 352], has not been created yet, hence it remains an
open – and very challenging – research problem.
To be sure, this is where we expect to rely on the ontological apparatus of the theory of
multiplicity proposed by Guattari [190] (possibly originally inspired by C. S. Pierce’s ontology
of mathematical being [275] and Russell’s mathematical philosophy [226]), and extensively
further developed throughout the joint collaboration with Deleuze [8, 25, 196, 353].46 It is
46The recent of publication of hitherto unavailable letters by Deleuze to Guattari [354] appears to
suggest (at some places) that the concept of multiplicity is due to Deleuze, while the molar/molecular
division is Guattari’s. It is not my intention to enter into meticulous textual analysis in this paper;
however, careful reading of the manuscripts and notes that Guattari composed while working with
Deleuze on The Anti-Oedipus strongly suggest that the ontological category of multiplicities was
highly advanced in his mind in the early 1970s [190]. It is also true that Deleuze’s 1969 text [31],
which influenced Guattari, does mention and briefly discuss the concept of the multiple at several
locations in the book. It is best then to admit that the mutual exchange of concepts between Deleuze
and Guattari had been very intense and unusual for typical “academic collaborations.” I hope to
address this fascinating topic in a separate place. For now, the most comprehensive account of
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true that this complex body of thought has been treated with suspicion by many (Foucault
included?), who considered it “too speculative,” or sometimes “overtly materialistic,” but the
major problem of how to construct a theory of subjectivity within the new ontological scheme
remains unsettled by the actual text of Capitalism and Schizophrenia [8,25]. One of the main
objectives of event ontology is to address the relation between Nature and the production of
the subject in a more detailed and extensive fashion.
It should be noted that Guattari’s effort to write down such theory in texts signed by his
solo name, e.g., see [190,191,276], suggests that the concept of subjectivization could not be
further pushed forward within the formal apparatus of Deleuze’s ontology. At the same time,
Foucault himself was never a diehard ontologist, at least not in the open manner in which
Russell, Heidegger, and Deleuze had been. Therefore, after Foucault’s death in 1984, we find
Deleuze changing course by writing individual small books expounding Guattari’s thought
as already developed and filtered in and through the 1970s collaboration [196, 199, 341]. At
the same time, Guattari was beginning to experience increasing personal and intellectual
difficulties throughout the last decade ending by his sudden death in 1992 [355]. All of this
and other evidence point to the fact that, up to date, no sufficiently developed Deleuzeo-
Guattarian ontology of the world can be found in the postmodernist literature serving as a
background for a theory of subjectivity in line with the map sketched above [348].
8. Conclusions: The Event Structure of the World, Subjectivity, and
Their Mode of Interrelatedness as Open Research Problems
The attempt to deal with the problem of subjectivity ultimately depends on creating a fully
developed ontology of events, the event being more fundamental than subjects and objects
and in a certain sense “prior” to them, though no Kantian transcendentalist connotation is
implied by using the term. Event ontology is a continuation of the theory of multiplicity
already found in Deleuze and Guattari [8, 191], but it has its roots in their sources:
Russell, Pierce, Whitehead, and of course first in Leibniz. Note that we do not consider
ancient atomism [9, 356] and medieval corpuscularism [107] as precursors to event ontology.
Atoms/corpuscles and events are technically quite distinct natural ontological categories.
As was suggested above, the motivation for introducing events is to dethrone the
privileged position in Western philosophy played by perception. Perception also calls into
mind the other closely related concept of introspection, though the former is not reducible to
the latter. In any case, considerably larger literature has been written on perception compared
with introspection, the disproportionality is probably traceable back to the obscurity of
introspective phenomena in general since they are commonly regarded “subjective” and hence
controversial or at best ambiguous. Descartes made masterful use of both perception and
introspection in his philosophy. Kant somehow pushed the problem back to perception.
Fichte and Hegel brought introspection to the fore. Husserl combined both (like Descartes),
while Sartre returned to introspection [215, 357] and Merleau-Ponty favored perception
[216, 217]. In modern time, it is with Heidegger, Russell, Whitehead, Bergson, Jakob von
Uexküll, Mach, that an alternative was sought, an approach to reality that does not pass
through the doors of sensation and feelings as experienced by a central human subject,
presupposed to play the role of the ultimate ontological model (Idealism.)
The event structure of the world understands the real as an emerging formal pattern
created within a context-dependent field of morphogenetic forces. Events, being prior to
objects and things, do not presume a subject or Subject, and they themselves are not things
or entities, though all such subjects, objects, things, entities will come into being precisely
because once upon the time there were events in the world. More importantly, events are
prior to space, so if we provisionally define events as “pure movements,” then one would
the relation between Guattari and Deleuze (in English) that I am aware of remains the extensive
intellectual biography [355].
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come back to the Bergsonian dictum: Movements precede space [1]. The event does not
replace the Subject by postulating a universal form of matter as often found in mainstream
materialism, which is nothing but “inverted Idealism.” While the need to think in terms of
events instead of physicochemical atoms/molecules is dictated by philosophical reasons, the
purely scientific basis of materialism was questioned and shown to be not well established
or as solid as sometimes stated. Both philosophically and scientifically, we believe that the
advent of the event is ontologically necessary and even inevitable. This is because, first, as we
retied to demonstrate in this paper, because of the nature of the unique manner in which the
intellectual problematic of nature has been historically evolving so far; and, second, in order
to meet the ethico-political need for grounding the politics of resistance upon the foundations
of an ontological theory of subjectivization. Ontology will become a philosophy of nature.
The philosophy of nature will then metamorphose into social ontology.
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